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Charkaoui and Bill C-3: Some
Implications for Anti-Terrorism
Policy and Dialogue between Courts
and Legislatures
Kent Roach

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration)1 and the government’s response to that decision in Bill
C-32 bring together two areas of scholarly interest: anti-terrorism law and
policy and Charter dialogues between courts and legislatures about the
treatment of rights. The Court’s decision in Charkaoui that the absence
of adversarial challenge to the secret information used by the
government to justify detention and deportation of non-citizens was an
unjustified violation of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms is an important example of the anti-majoritarian role of courts
in protecting rights of the unpopular that were ignored in the legislative
process.3 It is difficult to imagine a group — non-citizens alleged to be
involved with terrorism — who would have less political power in a

Professor of Law, and Prichard and Wilson Chair in Law and Public Policy, University
of Toronto. I thank Mathew Scott for excellent research assistance and acknowledge the continuing
support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.
1
[2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Charkaoui”].
2
An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2008, c. 3.
3
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. The theory of
dialogue has sometimes been criticized for not justifying the judicial contribution to the dialogue.
My own view is that the judicial role should be justified with respect both to the unique role of
unelected judges in protecting vulnerable minorities as well as the role of courts in protecting
fundamental principles such as adjudicative fairness that may be neglected by legislative and the
executive branches that are more committed to responding to popular concerns such as public
safety. See Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) c. 13. For a recent symposium examining many controversies about
dialogue between courts and legislatures under the Charter, see “Charter Dialogue: Ten Years Later”
(2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1-192.
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democracy.4 The Court in Charkaoui shone a spotlight on the treatment
of these outcasts and examined whether the government could advance
its interests in secrecy and social protection in a manner that was more
respectful of rights. It also found that Parliament had no valid rationale
for subjecting foreign nationals without permanent residence status in
Canada to much harsher treatment than permanent residents with respect
to the judicial review of their detention.5 This is not to say that the
Court’s decision was free from criticism, especially in its abrupt
rejection of the non-citizens’ challenge under section 15 of the Charter
and its deferral of deciding when indeterminate detention becomes
unconstitutional and unhinged from the prospect of deportation. The
Court might have decided more, but what it did decide was important
and beneficial.
Consistent with the theory that the Charter promotes dialogue
between courts and legislatures as an alternative to either judicial or
legislative supremacy, the Court in Charkaoui allowed Parliament to
select the precise means to increase adversarial challenge to security
certificates. It outlined a range of less rights-restrictive alternatives and
gave Parliament a year to fashion a legislative response to the decision
by suspending its main declaration of invalidity for 12 months. The
Court protected the rights of the unpopular, but recognized the ability of
Parliament to select and establish the precise means to provide
adversarial challenge to the secret evidence/intelligence used to support
detention and deportation under a security certificate. The Court’s
suspended declaration of invalidity, however, meant that the successful
applicants in the case did not receive an immediate remedy for their
victory in court. This raises the question of whether the wait for the
enactment of Bill C-3 as the ultimate remedy was worth it.
Serious concerns have been raised about both the process and
substance of the government’s response to Charkaoui.6 There was little
apparent consultation before Bill C-3 was introduced into Parliament on
October 22, 2007.7 The Bill was debated in the Commons Public Safety
4

But see as well Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] S.C.J. No. 28, 2008 SCC 28 (S.C.C.)
holding that the s. 7 rights of a Canadian citizen accused of involvement with Al Qaeda and of
killing an American soldier in Afghanistan were violated by the non-disclosure of records of
interviews with him by Canadian officials at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
5
Charkaoui, supra, note 1, at paras. 88-89.
6
See Craig Forcese & Lorne Waldman, “A Bismarckian Moment: Charkaoui and Bill
C-3” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 355 [hereinafter “Forcese & Waldman”].
7
In its response to the delayed three-year review of the Anti-terrorism Act, S.C. 2001,
c. 41, the government signalled in July 2007 only that it would study “the possibility of establishing
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and National Security committee for only six days, with four of those
days being allocated to non-governmental witnesses. Some amendments
were proposed by that Committee and made to the Bill with respect to
the status and selection of special advocates, but they did not address the
major criticisms of the Bill in relation to the ability of the special
advocate to have contact with the detainee after having seen the secret
evidence or to demand further disclosure from the government. The Bill
was debated over eight days in the House of Commons but over only
two days in the Senate as the deadline for the suspension of the
declaration of invalidity approached. The Bill was only given first
reading in the Senate on February 6, 2008 and was passed on February
12, 2008, less than two weeks before the Court’s declaration of
invalidity would take full effect. After having held hearings for one day
in a marathon 10-hour session, the Special Senate Committee on AntiTerrorism law pointedly commented that it “would have appreciated
more time to reflect upon all aspects of this bill and the views of those
concerned, given the life-altering effects that security certificates have
on those named in them, and the reflection the process has on Canadian
society and values”.8
Although it facilitated a legislative reply to Charkaoui, the
suspended declaration of invalidity, coupled with the government’s
decision not to introduce the Bill until eight months after the Court’s
decision, produced a rushed parliamentary debate. The Bill was passed
in the House of Commons by a vote of 197 to 71. The political debate
about Bill C-3 was also affected by the reluctance of the official
Opposition to defeat the minority government on an issue that was
presented as implicating public safety. There was no provision in Bill C-

a special advocate role in the security certificate process” but provided no rationale for why it had
apparently rejected alternative models for adversarial challenge or alternative models of special
advocates. “Response of the Government of Canada to the Final Report of the House of Commons
Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security on the Review of the Anti-Terrorism
Act” July 2007. On the contrast between the laconic response by the Canadian government and the
more detailed response by the British government which at the same time issued six detailed
discussion documents and invited public consultation on its proposed anti-terrorism legislation see
Kent Roach, “Better Late than Never? The Canadian Parliamentary Review of the Anti-Terrorism
Act” (2007) 13(5) Choices 1, at 27 [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Better Late Than Never?’ ”].
8
Second Report of the Special Senate Committee on the Anti-Terrorism Act, February
2008. This Committee has developed considerable expertise with respect to anti-terrorism law and
policy over the years. See Kent Roach, “The Role and Capacities of Courts and Legislatures in
Reviewing Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Law” (2008) 24 Windsor Rev. Legal Soc. Issues 5, at 17-18
[hereinafter “Roach, ‘Role and Capacities of Courts’ ”].
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3 to require a subsequent parliamentary review of its operation.9 The
rushed process that was used to enact Bill C-3 left much to be desired.10
On its substantive merits, Bill C-3 has been criticized for selecting
the least robust form of adversarial challenge outlined by the Court,
namely, the British system of security-cleared special advocates. Special
advocates under Bill C-3 will be able to challenge the government’s
claims that evidence must be kept secret and the relevance and reliability
of the secret evidence. They will not, however, be able to consult the
detainee or other persons after they have seen the secret evidence,
demand further disclosure from the government or call their own
witnesses without prior judicial approval. In this respect, special
advocates have less power than counsel for the Security Intelligence
Review Committee (“SIRC”), the review body for Canadian Security
Intelligence Service (“CSIS”), that used to review security certificates.
They also have less powers than counsel for public inquiries such as the
Commission of Inquiry into the Activities of Canadian Officials in
Relation to Maher Arar (the “Arar Commission”). Commission counsel
had powers to demand full disclosure from the government, call
witnesses and consult with the affected person after having seen the
secret information. These powers were not explicitly denied to special
advocates under Bill C-3,11 but they require the approval and supervision
of the specially designated judges of the Federal Court who preside over
security certificate cases.12 Bill C-3 also does not follow section 38 of the
Canada Evidence Act (“CEA”),13 which allows a Federal Court to
balance the public interest in disclosure against the public interest in
9

The Senate Special Committee is, however, conducting a continuing review of the
legislation and is expected to issue its continuing review by the end of 2008.
10
Forcese & Waldman, supra, note 6. For similar observations about the rushed nature of
the debate about the Anti-terrorism Act enacted in the aftermath of 9/11, as well as the debate about
the expiry of investigative hearings and preventive arrests in 2007, see Kent Roach, September 11:
Consequences for Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queens, 2003) c. 3 and Roach, “Better Late than
Never?”, supra, note 7, at 8-11. One of the advantages of the judicial process over the legislative
process is that the former generally has adequate time for reflection and deliberation on the issues.
See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1986).
11
David Dunbar & Scott Nesbitt, “Parliament’s Response to Charkaoui: Bill C-3 and the
Special Advocate Regime under IRPA” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 415.
12
Bill C-3 also gives the Federal Court a degree of ownership over special advocates by
providing that the Chief Justice of the Federal Court and the Chief Justice of the Federal Court of
Appeal shall establish a committee to make rules for special advocates: Bill C-3, s. 85.6. On the role
of the Federal Court in security certificates, see Benjamin Berger, “Our Evolving Judicature:
Security Certificates, Detention Review, and the Federal Court” (2006) 39 U.B.C. L. Rev. 101.
13
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
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secrecy and to order the disclosure of information that may harm
national security. Under Bill C-3, the Federal Court must still not
disclose any information to the detainee once it determines that its
disclosure would harm national security or any other person. Despite the
initial euphoria at the Court victory, the end result of the dialogue was a
disappointment for many.
In this article, I will use the Charkaoui case and its legislative
aftermath as a case study in the development of anti-terrorism policy and
dialogue between courts and legislature. The study of dialogue — or
what some might wish to describe less metaphorically as the institutional
role of and exchanges between courts and legislatures — should
examine what courts and legislatures actually do and not be based on
idealized visions of either institution. The back and forth between courts
and legislatures has been a feature of not only recent Canadian debates
about anti-terrorism law, but also those in the United Kingdom and the
United States.14 The Charkaoui and Bill C-3 dialogue provide evidence
of the strengths and weaknesses of both courts and legislatures in dealing
with anti-terrorism laws.15 It is by no means clear that either courts or
legislatures are handling the challenges of responding to terrorism very
well.
The dialogue model of judicial review seeks to find and justify time
and space for legislative responses and democratic debate about court
decisions about rights and freedoms. The dialogue model does not,
however, guarantee that legislatures will necessarily fill the policy space
that is available to them or that it will do so wisely. Indeed, the
possibility of legislative failure and short-sightedness underlines that
dialogue is a genuine democratic dialogue and not simply one where the
legislators follow the orders of the judges. Bill C-3 also reveals a
phenomenon that is often neglected by critics of judicial activism, 16
namely, that elected governments and legislatures are frequently happy
to defer some issues to the judiciary. As will be seen, Bill C-3 defers to
the judiciary the critical decisions about whether the special advocate
can obtain full disclosure, call witnesses and consult the detainee after
having seen the secret information. It also leaves the question of the
14

Kent Roach, “Sharpening the Dialogue Debate: The Next Decade of Scholarship” (2007)
45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 169, at 186-89.
15
For a broader review of this question see Roach, “Role and Capacities of Courts”, supra,
note 8.
16
For an exception see Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences
of the New Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).
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limits of indeterminate detention under sections 7 and 12 of the Charter to
the decisions of courts in particular cases. Finally, it leaves the related
question of whether Canada will breach its international law obligations by
deporting people to torture to the decisions of judges in applying the
Suresh17 exception despite recommendations by a number of parliamentary
committees that Parliament reject the use of such an exception. Charkaoui
and Bill C-3 will not resolve democratic debates about security certificates.
In this essay, I will first examine the Court’s decision in Charkaoui.
Charkaoui is best known for its holding that the absence of any
adversarial challenge to the secret evidence presented by the government
violated the detainee’s right to know the case to be met under section 7
of the Charter. The Court held that this violation could not be justified
under section 1 because of the existence of a number of alternative
measures that would infringe the detainee’s rights less while still
respecting the government’s objectives of protecting secrets. The Court’s
survey of less rights-invasive alternatives was wide-ranging and included
the British special advocate system, the former system used to review
security certificates by SIRC, the use of undertakings by the accused’s
lawyers in the Air India trial and the use of the national security
confidentiality proceedings in section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act. I
will suggest that the Court may have misunderstood the use of securitycleared counsel in the Arar commission and that this is an example of the
need for courts to be cautious about opining about possible responses by
legislatures to its decisions. The very fact that the Court mentioned the
British special advocate seemed to have been interpreted by some as a
sort of pre-approval of that scheme, even though the Court correctly
noted that there has been a number of serious criticisms of special
advocates in the United Kingdom on the grounds that they could not
generally call witnesses or have discussions with the affected person
after having seen the classified material.18 One of the values of dialogue
is that it allows for further research by the executive and the legislature
into the range of possible responses to the Court’s decisions19 and
democratic debate and choice about those options.
17
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002]
1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
18
Charkaoui, supra, note 1, at para. 83.
19
Although the judiciary, assisted by law clerks, can also conduct research, this research is
restricted to library research whereas both the executive and legislative committees can consult
experts and even visit other countries to explore other policy options. For an examination of the
number of witnesses consulted by parliamentary committees that have examined anti-terrorism laws
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It will be suggested that the Court’s summary dismissal of the claims
that the security certificate procedure violated section 15 is problematic
in a number of respects. In contrast to the House of Lords in its
Belmarsh decision,20 the Court failed to explore the rationality of using
immigration law as anti-terrorism law. The Court’s decision that the
indeterminate detention of the detainees did not violate sections 7 and 12
is also problematic. The Court seemed to accept that the long-term
detention of the three men was still justified because it remained
connected to the prospect that they could be deported if their certificates
were upheld. The Court’s approach may be formally and technically
correct, but only because of the strange absence on the record of the
cases of findings that the men in the case (particularly Hassan Almrei
who would be deported to Syria, but also Adil Charkaoui who would be
deported to Morocco and Mohamed Harkat who would be deported to
Algeria) would be tortured if deported to their countries of citizenship.21
Nevertheless, if one accepts that the men would face a substantial risk of
torture if returned to their home countries then the only connection with
possible deportation is to invoke the Suresh exception that would allow
deportation to a substantial risk of torture.
The Court’s refusal to explore the limits of indeterminate detention
and the related issue of whether deportation to torture could be justified
can be defended as one-case-at-a-time constitutionalism minimalism
advocated by Cass Sunstein.22 Constitutional minimalism may serve the
as well as a criticism of the shortage of research support for such committees see Roach, “Better
Late than Never?”, supra, note 7. For proposals for greater use of expert committees see Craig
Forcese, “Fixing the Deficiencies in Parliamentary Review of Anti-Terrorism Law: Lessons from
the United Kingdom and Australia” (2008) 14(6) Choices.
20
A. v. Secretary of State, for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68
(U.K.H.L.).
21
Both Amnesty International and the U.S. Department of State have expressed concerns
about the torture of suspected terrorists in Morocco, Syria and Algeria as well as Egypt, to which
Mahmoud Jaballah and Mohamed Majoub, the other security certificate detainees, face deportation.
See Amnesty International, Morocco/Western Sahara: Torture in the “Anti-Terrorism” Campaign
— the case of Témara Detention Centre (AI Index: MDE 29/004/2004), June 2004; Syria: Unfair
Trial and Sentencing of Muhammad Haydar Zammar: Appeal Case Update 3 (AI Index: MDE
24/020/2007), March 2007; Algeria: Torture in the “War on Terror”: A Memorandum to the
Algerian President (AI Index: MDE 28/008/2006), April 2006; Egypt: Systematic Abuses in the
Name of Security (AI Index: MDE 12/001/2007). See also the Country Report on Human Rights
Practices issued by the United States Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor for each of Morocco (March 2006), Syria (March 2006), Algeria (March 2007) and Egypt
(March 2007).
22
Cass Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Cass Sunstein, “Minimalism at War” (2004) Sup. Ct.
Rev. 47. See also Neil S. Siegel, “A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at
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institutional interests of the judiciary in keeping their “powder dry”,23 but
in this context, it will likely extend the detention of men who have been
detained many years under immigration law even though in all
likelihood, they cannot be deported without running a substantial risk of
torture.
In the second section, I will examine the way in which Bill C-3
responds to the Court’s decision in Charkaoui. Bill C-3 contemplates
that special advocates will challenge the government’s argument that
evidence cannot be disclosed to the detainee because of harms to
national security and other persons and that special advocates can
challenge the secret evidence that is submitted. That said, Bill C-3
contains a very broad prohibition on the ability of the special advocate to
consult any person about the case after the special advocate has
examined the secret information. It delegates decisions about whether
the special advocate can, after having seen the secret information, have
contact with detainees or indeed anyone else about the information and
whether the special advocate can obtain further disclosure and call
witnesses to the decisions of the presiding Federal Court judge. This
delegation of critical issues to judges suggests that legislatures may
have an interest in avoiding some of the most contentious policy issues.
It also increases the likelihood that in subsequent Charter challenges to
Bill C-3, the courts will find that a judge has erred on the facts of a
particular case as opposed to striking down Bill C-3 as a whole. In other
words, the one-case-at-a-time constitutional minimalism of the Court’s
decision in Charkaoui is echoed in a one-case-at-a-time approach in Bill
C-3 to judicial authorization of the ability of the special advocate to
exercise powers beyond challenge to governmental claims of secrecy
and to the reliability and relevance of the secret evidence.
Another feature of Bill C-3 is that it follows the Supreme Court’s
ruling that the deferral of judicial review of detention for non-citizens
who are not permanent residents could not be justified and that it
provides for the same requirements for judicial review of all detentions
under security certificates. This raises the issue of whether dialogue
between courts and legislatures most often result in the latter obeying the
the Supreme Court Bar” (2005) 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1951; Cass Sunstein, “Testing Minimalism: A
Reply” (2005) 104 Mich. L. Rev. 129. For Canadian support of constitutionalism minimalism in the
different context of Aboriginal rights litigation see Patrick Monahan, “The Supreme Court in the
21st Century” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 374, at 391-97.
23
The phrase is that of my colleague David Dyzenhaus. See David Dyzenhaus, “Legality in
a Time of Emergency” (2008) 24 Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues 1, at 2.
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rulings of the former. It will be suggested that in some cases, there may
be little viable alternative than to follow the thrust of a court’s ruling, but
that even in those cases, the legislature retains the option to make subtle
variations on the court’s rulings.
I will also examine the few instances in which Bill C-3 expands the
policy debate beyond a precise response to Charkaoui and addresses
other questions. These other questions include recognition of the ability
of the special advocate to challenge the relevancy and reliability of the
secret evidence, to challenge secret evidence on the basis that it was
obtained as a result of torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment,
the recognition of the use of house arrests for security certificate
detainees as an alternative to imprisonment, the recognition of limited
appeals and the recognition of the ability to authorize the release of
security certificate detainees to allow them to leave Canada for a third
country.
In the third section, I will examine Bill C-3 as an example of
truncated dialogue both with respect to security certificates and with
respect to the treatment of secret information in all legal proceedings,
most notably under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act. Although
some may be tempted to see Parliament’s response to Charkaoui as a
sign that security certificates can be “Charter proofed”, I will suggest
that many other Charter issues remain surrounding the issue of long-term
indeterminate detention and the related issue of deporting a person to a
substantial risk of torture. With respect to the treatment of secret
information, Bill C-3 takes a narrow approach to the use of special
advocates and rejects the advice of two parliamentary committees that
special advocates be available with respect to other procedures where the
government uses secret evidence or is allowed to make ex parte
submissions that the disclosure of information will harm national
security. The government’s partial response leaves the availability of
special advocates to be litigated in a case-by-case manner. It also does
not respond to documented recent cases in which the government has
overclaimed national security confidentiality or the need for Canada to
reform and discipline the process in which national security confidentiality
is claimed. Such a process would make criminal prosecutions a more
viable alternative to reliance on immigration law security certificates.
My conclusion will assess the lessons of Charkaoui and Bill C-3
both for the development of fair and effective anti-terrorism policy and
for dialogue between courts and legislatures about the treatment of the
rights of the unpopular. The end result of this dialogue has been to
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achieve a fairer security certificate process, but not one that is
sustainable from either a rights or a security perspective. The Court’s
summary treatment of the equality rights claims allowed it to avoid the
discussion of the rationality and proportionality of using immigration
law with its ultimate remedy of deportation as anti-terrorism law. The
Court also avoided the critical question of when indeterminate detention
becomes unconstitutional in part by implicitly relying on the disturbing
possibility that the three men could still be deported to Syria, Algeria or
Morocco. The Court’s minimalist approach to these issues set the stage
for a legislative reply that was similarly minimalist in only providing
special advocates for security certificate proceedings and not addressing
larger issues concerning the treatment of secret information or the
sustainability of security certificates. Even with respect to special
advocates, the government made a conscious decision to delegate some
of the most contentious issues in the legislation to the judiciary, thus
suggesting that governments may often find it attractive to do so.
Bill C-3 will not end Charter litigation or continued debate about
security certificates. Indeed, the dialogue so far has only deferred the
critical questions of when indeterminate detention under security
certificates becomes unconstitutional; whether deportation to a
substantial risk of torture will be allowed or whether a special advocate
should be allowed to seek further disclosure or consult the detainee after
having seen the secret information.

II. CHARKAOUI
1. The Court’s Decision
In Charkaoui, the Court described the security certificate regime in
the following revealing terms:
Confidentiality is a constant preoccupation of the certificate scheme.
The judge “shall ensure” the confidentiality of the information on
which the certificate is based and of any other evidence if, in the
opinion of the judge, disclosure would be injurious to national security
or to the safety of any person: s. 78(b). At the request of either minister
“at any time during the proceedings”, the judge “shall hear” information
or evidence in the absence of the named person and his or her counsel
if, in the opinion of the judge, its disclosure would be injurious to
national security or to the safety of any person: s. 78(e). The judge
“shall provide” the named person with a summary of information that
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enables him or her to be reasonably informed of the circumstances
giving rise to the certificate, but the summary cannot include anything
that would, in the opinion of the judge, be injurious to national security
or to the safety of any person: s. 78(h). Ultimately, the judge may have
to consider information that is not included in the summary: s. 78(g).
In the result, the judge may be required to decide the case, wholly or in
part, on the basis of information that the named person and his or her
counsel never see. The named person may know nothing of the case to
meet, and although technically afforded an opportunity to be heard,
may be left in a position of having no idea as to what needs to be
said.24

The Court thus accepted the idea that the security certificate process was
one driven by secret evidence. The process could result in unfairness to
the detainee by justifying his detention and possible deportation on the
basis of evidence never seen by the detainee or his counsel.
The Court in a unanimous judgment by the Chief Justice held that
the use of secret evidence violated the section 7 rights of the detainee.
The Court took a contextual approach to interpreting the Charter right,
rejecting the idea that section 7 did not apply in the immigration and
security contexts. It concluded that the impugned scheme placed the
burden of ensuring the fairness and the accuracy of the decision “entirely
on the shoulders of the designated judge”, adding:
… Those shoulders cannot by themselves bear the heavy burden of
assuring, in fact and appearance, that the decision on the reasonableness
of the certificate is impartial, is based on a full view of the facts and
law, and reflects the named person’s knowledge of the case to meet.
The judge, working under the constraints imposed by the IRPA, simply
cannot fill the vacuum left by the removal of the traditional guarantees
of a fair hearing. The judge sees only what the ministers put before him
or her. The judge, knowing nothing else about the case, is not in a
position to identify errors, find omissions or assess the credibility and
truthfulness of the information in the way the named person would be.
Although the judge may ask questions of the named person when the
hearing is reopened, the judge is prevented from asking questions that
might disclose the protected information. Likewise, since the named
person does not know what has been put against him or her, he or she
does not know what the designated judge needs to hear. If the judge
cannot provide the named person with a summary of the information
that is sufficient to enable the person to know the case to meet, then the
judge cannot be satisfied that the information before him or her is
24

Charkaoui, supra, note 1, at para. 55.
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sufficient or reliable. Despite the judge’s best efforts to question the
government’s witnesses and scrutinize the documentary evidence, he or
she is placed in the situation of asking questions and ultimately deciding
the issues on the basis of incomplete and potentially unreliable
information.25

Although the Court rejected the idea that the reviewing Federal Court
judges were no longer independent and impartial and praised the Federal
Court for adopting a “pseudo-inquisitorial role”,26 it raised concerns
about the factual and legal accuracy of decisions that were made without
effective adversarial challenge.27
The Court also resisted the idea that the interpretation of section 7
rights should be collapsed into the process of attempting to justify
violations of rights under section 1 of the Charter. The Chief Justice
stressed that “the issue at the s. 7 stage, as discussed above, is not
whether the government has struck the right balance between the need
for security and individual liberties; that is the issue at the stage of s. 1
justification of an established limitation on a Charter right. The question
at the s. 7 stage is whether the basic requirements of procedural justice
have been met …”. This division between the section 7 and section 1
issues is appropriate because it allows the courts to insist on basic
fairness under section 7 while facilitating a structured inquiry into the
proportionality of any departures from these standards under section 1 of
the Charter. Although dicta that suggest that section 7 violations can
never be justified under section 128 may be intended to strengthen section
7 rights, they actually diminish the scope of those rights and allow the
government to avoid having to justify limits on rights and demonstrate
their proportionality.29
Having concluded that the existing scheme violated section 7 of the
Charter because the detainee could not know and challenge the case
25

Id., at para. 63.
Id., at para. 51.
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For arguments that the concepts of and learning about miscarriages of justice and
wrongful convictions should apply to long-term administrative detention see Kent Roach & Gary
Trotter, “Miscarriages of Justice in the War Against Terror” (2005) 109 Penn. State L. Rev. 967.
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Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.) S. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
486, at 518 (S.C.C.).
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For arguments that the Court’s approach of effectively eliminating the possibility of
justifying reasonable limits on s. 7 rights may have had a debilitating effect on the scope of s. 7
rights at least in the context of the constitutionalization of the principles of subjective fault under
s. 7 see Kent Roach, “Common Law Bills of Rights as Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures”
(2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 733.
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against him, the Court then considered whether the state could justify the
procedures under section 1 of the Charter. The Court adverted to its prior
jurisprudence which effectively had eliminated the ability to justify
violations of section 7 under section 1 of the Charter, but noted that such
justifications “may not be impossible”.30 The effect of discussing the
alternatives to the existing procedure under section 1 was to place the
burden on the government to justify departures from basic standards of
adjudicative fairness. In general, the government is in the best position to
be able to marshal the evidence to justify limitations on rights. This is
particularly true in the national security context where the applicants not
only have less resources than the state, but often lack basic information
about the rationale of the state’s national security activities because of
the secrecy that surrounds them.31 The Charter applicants in this case had
been excluded from secret hearings in their case for years and it would
have been particularly inappropriate to require them to demonstrate why
these hearings were not necessary. The burden of justification for such
extraordinary procedures should be on the government.
2. The Court’s Discussion of Alternatives to the Existing Regime of
Secret Evidence
The Court readily accepted that the protection of secret information
was a pressing and substantial objective that could justify the limitation
of Charter rights, noting that “Canada is a net importer of security
information. This information is essential to the security and defence of
Canada, and disclosure would adversely affect its flow and quality.”32 In
the end, however, the Court found that the government had not
demonstrated the proportionality of the limitation because there was a
range of alternatives that would provide for adversarial challenge to the
government’s secret evidence while respecting the need to keep the
information secret. The Court quite appropriately discussed a range of
less rights-invasive alternatives. The primary purpose of this discussion
was to explain and justify the Court’s decision to strike the impugned
30

Charkaoui, supra, note 1, at para. 66.
Gus Van Harten, “Charkaoui and Secret Evidence” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 251
[hereinafter “Van Harten”].
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on condition that it not be disclosed. Or it may simply be so critical that it cannot be disclosed
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scheme down as an unjustified violation of the Charter. At the same
time, such a discussion of alternatives also provided policy-makers with
important information about what sort of a new scheme could pass
constitutional muster. Indeed it is likely that this part of the judgment
was read closely by the policy-makers and government lawyers who
drafted the legislative reply to the Court’s decision. In subtle but
important ways, the way the Court discusses possible less drastic
alternatives can shape the eventual legislative reply and for this reason it
is important for the Court to be careful about what signals and hints it
sends to policy-makers.
(a) The SIRC Model
The Court spent the most time discussing the role played by SIRC in
investigating security certificates before they were issued. This role
applied to all security certificates until 1988 and to security certificates
issued against permanent residents until 2002. The Court stressed that
“independent security-cleared SIRC counsel” would cross-examine
CSIS witnesses when the affected person was excluded from the hearing
and then “would negotiate the contents of the summary with CSIS, under
the supervision of the presiding SIRC member. … These procedures
illustrate how special counsel can provide not only an effective
substitute for informed participation, but can also help bolster actual
informed participation by the affected person.”33 The Court relied on an
article by a former independent counsel for SIRC. 34 Although the article
makes a valuable contribution about practices that were not widely
known, it focused on complaints that were heard by SIRC about the
denial or withdrawal of security clearances and not on security
certificates. The article also did not explicitly address the critical
questions of whether SIRC counsel would consult with the affected
parties after having seen the secret information about possible lines of
cross-examination or whether SIRC counsel would seek further
disclosure. The article also examined the alternative of allowing the
complainant’s own counsel to obtain a security clearance and see the
secret information while warning about the dangers to CSIS and allied

33
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Murray Rankin, “The Security Intelligence Review Committee: Reconciling National
Security with Procedural Fairness” (1990) 3 C.J.A.L.P. 173.
34

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CHARKAOUI AND BILL C-3

295

agencies of any leaks of the secret information.35 The Court’s reliance on
this article reflects its reliance on library research.36 The executive and
Parliamentary committees would not be limited to such forms of
research and could question various representatives of and counsel for
SIRC about the workings of the system. For this reason, the Court’s
discussion of policy alternatives in section 1 analysis should not be
treated as the final or definitive word about the specific policy
alternative.
(b) The Section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act Model
The Court also examined the role of the judge in balancing the
interests of secrecy and disclosure under section 38 of the Canada
Evidence Act, which allows the government to seek non-disclosure
orders from specially designated judges of the Federal Court in civil,
criminal and administrative proceedings on the basis that the harm of
disclosure to national security, national defence or international relations
is greater than the public interest in disclosure. The Court noted that the
impugned immigration law procedure did not allow the judge to weigh
the competing interests but rather “requires judges not to disclose
information the disclosure of which is injurious to national security or
the safety of any person”.37 The Court also noted that unlike the
immigration law procedure, the CEA “makes no provision for the use of
information that has not been disclosed”.38 Although it can be used in
civil and administrative proceedings, the practical implication here is
that secret evidence is not used in criminal trials.39 In addition, the trial
judge retains a full discretion under section 38.14 to fashion any remedy
that is necessary to protect the accused’s right to a fair trial in light of the
Federal Court’s non-disclosure order. This remedy could include a stay
of proceedings, and such a remedy has indeed been ordered in a case in
which two men were originally convicted in 1986 of conspiring to blow
up an Air India plane.40
35

Id., at 196.
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The treatment of those accused of terrorism crimes under section 38
of the Canada Evidence Act would be a main feature of a comparison
between the treatment of citizens and non-citizens thought to be
involved with terrorism, but the Court was cautious about such a
comparison observing that “the CEA does not address the same
problems as the IRPA, and hence is of limited assistance here …”.41 The
Court did not really explain the rationale for this conclusion. This is
unfortunate because the Court’s conclusion may have encouraged the
government to reject section 38 of the CEA as a model for the reform of
the immigration law.42 If judges are allowed to balance the competing
interests in disclosure and non-disclosure in criminal trials, or indeed in
the broad range of proceedings including public inquiries, civil lawsuits
and other administrative proceedings, to which section 38 applies, it is
not clear why the immigration context requires non-disclosure once any
injury to national security from the disclosure of the information is
established.
(c) The Undertaking of Counsel in the Air India Trial Model
The Court also examined the procedure used in the Air India trial in
which sensitive material was disclosed to counsel for the accused on
initial undertakings that the information not be shared with the accused
or any other person. The Court had appeared to express misgivings about
this approach in its 2004 decision in the Air India investigative hearing
case43 but these misgivings were not repeated here, perhaps because the
Court had subsequently approved a similar undertaking by counsel
process in the access to information context in order to preserve
confidentiality.44 The Court in Charkaoui did note, however, that
“[d]isclosure in a specific trial, to a select group of counsel on
undertakings, may not provide a working model for general deportation
legislation that must deal with a wide variety of counsel in a host of
cases. Nevertheless, the procedures adopted in the Air India trial suggest
that a search should be made for a less intrusive solution than one found
41
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For arguments that s. 38 should be used as a model for such reforms see Craig Forcese &
Lorne Waldman, Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process (August 2007) (available at
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in the IRPA.”45 This statement, however, overestimates the number of
security certificate cases and the fact that the detainees have been
represented by a small group of experienced counsel. Indeed, as will be
seen, three lawyers who have represented detainees in security certificate
cases have qualified as special advocates under the regime established by
Bill C-3.
The approach used in the Air India trial can be defended on the basis
that the client would have to consent to the initial undertaking. It
recognizes that the affected person’s lawyer will know the most about a
case, but is not simply an agent for the client.46 In both the United States
and Australia, disclosure to the affected person’s lawyer is sometimes
made on the condition that the lawyer obtain a security clearance, in
addition to the condition that the secret information not be disclosed to
the client.
Some of the advantages of allowing the detainee’s lawyer to obtain
access to the secret evidence on the condition of obtaining a security
clearance may be achieved under the new special advocate regime in Bill
C-3 because two experienced lawyers who represented the security
certificate detainees, Paul Copeland and John Norris, have been
appointed and qualified as special advocates and have, subject to the
decision of the presiding judge, been allowed to act as special advocates
in the cases subject to undertaking that they cease acting as counsel for
their former clients in the open proceedings, as well as in related
matters.47 The government had objected to the two lawyers serving as
special advocates on the basis of concerns about conflict of interest and
inadvertent disclosure of secret material. The former concern is difficult
to understand as the special advocate and the detainee’s own lawyer
would have the same interest in challenging both the secret evidence and
the government’s claim to secrecy. The government’s concern about
inadvertent disclosure of secret information would seem to be the nub of
the matter. As will be seen, however, this concern discounts the ability
of commission counsel for the Arar Commission to have contact with the
affected person without disclosing secret information.
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Charkaoui, supra, note 37, at para. 78.
Michael Code & Kent Roach, “The Role of the Independent Lawyer and Security
Certificates” (2006) 52 C.L.Q. 85, at 109-11 [hereinafter “Code & Roach”].
47
In the Matter of the Appointment of John Norris and Paul Copeland as Special
Advocates, Order of Blanchard J., (April 14, 2008), DES 5-08, 6-08, 7-08.
46

298

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

(d) The British Special Advocate Model
The Court also discussed the British special advocate system as a
more proportionate alternative to the system in the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”) which provided no adversarial
challenge to the secret evidence. To its credit, the Court recognized that
British special advocates had been criticized on the basis that “(1) once
they have seen the confidential material, they cannot, subject to narrow
exceptions, take instructions from the appellant or the appellant’s
counsel; (2) they lack the resources of an ordinary legal team, for the
purpose of conducting in secret a full defence; and (3) they have no
power to call witnesses”.48 The Court also noted that rules established for
the Special Immigration Appeals Commission allowed the government to
object to any proposed communication between the special advocate and
the affected person and his or her counsel after the special advocate had
seen the secret information.
Most criticisms of British special advocates have focused on their
practical inability to consult the affected person after having seen the
secret information, but the concerns about inadequate disclosure are also
very serious. A study conducted by Craig Forcese and Lorne Waldman
revealed that some British special advocates that they interviewed
expressed concern about the adequacy of disclosure they received. Some
reported receiving redacted information or summaries of the information
and complained that they did not always have access to those within
security agencies who collected the information.49 These reports are at
odds with past reports that suggested that the government had adequately
disclosed to the special advocates material adverse to its case or helpful
to the excluded person’s case.50 They also explain why Forcese and
Waldman recommend not only that special advocates be able to ask
questions of the named person after seeing the secret information, but
also that there be some means of ensuring that the government has made
full disclosure to the special advocate. I agree with their analysis about
the critical importance of full disclosure.

48
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The issue of full disclosure is complicated by the learning about
tunnel vision in wrongful conviction cases.51 Tunnel vision refers to a
process in which authorities, often with the noblest of intentions, fixate
on a person’s purported guilt, discount or ignore information that points
to the person’s innocence and interpret ambiguous and even innocent
information as evidence of a person’s guilt. Tunnel vision is not
necessarily the product of deliberate misconduct by officials, but can be
the product of institutional pressures that increase as the state has
invested much time and resources in focusing on a suspect. The practical
concern is that CSIS might possess material in its files that someone
representing the detainees might be able to use as evidence to undermine
the case against the detainee. To the extent that the cases rely on
intelligence provided by foreign agencies, it may be impossible to ever
obtain full disclosure. There is a danger that the foreign agency may
selectively provide intelligence to Canadian officials or be affected by
tunnel vision which ignores or explains away potentially exculpatory
information.
(e) The Arar Commission Model
The Court discussed how the Arar Commission handled the challenges
of reconciling the need for secrecy with the need for disclosure in one
brief paragraph. It noted that the commission of inquiry was subject to
section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act and commented that “[t]o help
assess claims for confidentiality, the Commissioner was assisted by
independent security-cleared legal counsel with a background in security
and intelligence, whose role was to act as amicus curiae on confidentiality
applications. The scheme’s aim was to ensure that only information that
was rightly subject to national security confidentiality was kept from
public view. There is no indication that these procedures increased the
risk of disclosure of protected information.”52 This comment
unfortunately suggests that the Court may not have fully understood how
the Arar Commission handled the challenges of secret information.
Although the Court was correct in noting that security cleared amicus
curiae played a role in the Arar Commission in challenging the
government’s national security confidentiality (“NSC”) claims, it neglected
51
On tunnel vision see Bruce MacFarlane, “Convicting the Innocent: A Triple Failure of
the Justice System” (2006) 31 Man. L.J. 403.
52
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the more important place of security-cleared commission counsel in
ensuring that a full investigation took place and, where appropriate,
challenging governmental witnesses who presented evidence in the
closed hearings.
The fundamental role played by security-cleared commission
counsel in the Arar Commission was carefully explained by Justice
O’Connor in his public report. He explained that Commission counsel
had top secret security clearances and made numerous demands for
disclosure and obtained access to over 21,500 full text documents before
redaction.53 In light of the fact that many of the hearings were held in
camera with Mr. Arar and his counsel excluded and because counsel for
the Attorney General of Canada represented all departments and did not
explore differences in position between them, O’Connor J. explained
that he “instructed Commission counsel to test the in camera evidence
by means of cross-examination, when necessary. Thus, as one of the
steps in preparing to examine witnesses in camera, Commission counsel
met periodically with counsel for Mr. Arar and for the intervenors to
receive suggestions about areas for cross-examination. In the in camera
hearings, if Commission counsel thought it necessary, witnesses called
by the Commission were cross-examined, whether the Government agreed
or not. Commission counsel cross-examined many of the witnesses,
sometimes vigorously, and did so with considerable effectiveness.”54
The amicus curiae that was the focus of the Supreme Court’s
attention had a more limited role than Commission counsel in the Arar
Commission. They had access to all the documents that Commission
counsel had, but they did not meet with counsel for Mr. Arar or the
intervenors or cross-examine governmental witnesses. Rather, they
“made submissions about the substance of the Government’s NSC
claim”, issues that should be addressed in the Commission’s report, and
what parts of the report should be made public.55
Thus the central role of Commission counsel in the Arar Commission
included (1) ensuring that the government fully disclosed all documents
that were relevant to the inquiry’s work; (2) calling relevant witnesses;
(3) obtaining from counsel for the excluded parties suggestions for
cross-examination of key witnesses; (4) challenging when appropriate
53
Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar,
Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (Ottawa: Public
Works and Government Services 2006), at 290.
54
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55
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through cross-examination evidence presented in in camera proceedings;
and finally (5) challenging the government’s NSC claims. The amicus
curiae in contrast only played a key role with respect to challenging
NSC claims and making representations about what material could be
disclosed publicly.
Justice O’Connor added in his discussion of the central role of
Commission counsel that “having Commission counsel incorporate into
witness examinations the perspectives of those who had an interest, but
could not take part in the proceedings, helped to address the substantial
shortcomings in the process resulting from the exclusion of those parties”.56
Justice O’Connor characterized Commission counsel as “independent
counsel”. He stressed that if independent counsel were effectively to test
the evidence they “must have access to all relevant documents and must
be given the time and facilities to properly prepare”.57
A failure to understand the respective roles of Commission counsel
and the amicus curiae in the Arar Commission is more than a historical
quibble. It may have affected the design and adequacy of the
government’s response to Charkaoui in Bill C-3, including Parliament’s
judgment about the risk of inadvertent disclosure of secret material by a
security-cleared counsel such as Arar Commission counsel who
communicated with the affected person and his lawyer after having seen
the secret material. Indeed, the special advocates provided for under Bill
C-3 may turn out to play a role similar to that played by the amicus
curiae in the Arar Commission and by British special advocates. In other
words, special advocates under Bill C-3 are best equipped to challenge
governmental claims of national security confidentiality. Unlike
Commission counsel in the Arar Commission or counsel representing
SIRC, it is unclear whether special advocates will have the power (1) to
demand that the government disclose more relevant information, (2) to
call evidence to ensure that all relevant information has been presented
or (3) to consult with the affected person after they had access to the
secret information.
Although an Arar-style amicus curiae could play a valuable role in
challenging potentially overbroad secrecy claims made by governments
in security certificate cases, it would not necessarily make the process
significantly fairer for the detained person. There is a danger that new
security-cleared counsel inserted into the security certificate process
56
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might not have the power to dig up new information held by the
government or by third parties that mitigates or casts doubt on the
information submitted by the government. There is also a danger that
new security-cleared counsel might not, after seeing the secret
information, be able to obtain information from the affected person or
his counsel that might be necessary to make full answer and defence to
the secret information. As will be seen, the presiding judge under Bill C3 can allow the special advocate to have contact with the detainee and
his counsel after having seen the secret information, but may be reluctant
to do so because of concerns about the inadvertent disclosure of secret
information. Although the Supreme Court’s brief discussion of the Arar
Commission does not make this clear, the judge should understand that
commission counsel in the Arar Commission, not the amicus curiae,
were able to discuss matters with Mr. Arar and his counsel after having
seen the secret information with no concerns being raised that they
inadvertently disclosed secret information.
The Supreme Court’s neglect of the central role of commission
counsel in the Arar Commission is also unfortunate because the Court
elsewhere expressed a concern that one of the flaws of the present
security certificate system was that the reviewing judge might not have
access to all the relevant information. At several junctures in Charkaoui
the Court stressed that one of the problems with the hearings was that the
detainee was not in an informed position to demand full disclosure from
the government of all the relevant information. Chief Justice McLachlin,
for example, stated that “the judge sees only what the ministers put
before him or her”.58 She added: “the judge’s activity on behalf of the
named person is confined to what is presented by the ministers”.59 These
statements suggest that the Court may not have been persuaded that the
duty placed on Crown counsel to make full disclosure was an adequate
response to the unfairness of ex parte proceedings. Again, commission
counsel, as opposed to amicus curiae, could respond to such concerns
because only commission counsel or independent counsel representing a
review body such as SIRC would have powers to investigate all of
CSIS’s files to determine whether there was other relevant information
that would be of assistance to the security certificate detainee.
The role of commission counsel, like the former role of independent
counsel representing SIRC, provided a solid Canadian-built foundation
58
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for designing a response to Charkaoui. The independent counsel in both
proceedings can be distinguished from the Arar amicus curiae and
British special advocates on the basis that they have powers to demand
that the government produce all relevant evidence, if need be by calling
witnesses. The Air India trial model would also allow the lawyer to
make further demands for disclosure.
(f) Summary
Both the Arar commission counsel and the SIRC models, as well as
the Air India model, allow the independent counsel to consult with the
affected person after the independent counsel has seen the secret evidence.
In this manner, they avoided the most notorious problem with the British
special advocate procedure. That said, however, the difficulties of
independent counsel obtaining important information from the affected
person without revealing secrets should not be underestimated. In this
respect, it may be significant that Arar Commission counsel conducted
most of the discussions with Mr. Arar’s counsel. Although counsel owes
a strong duty of loyalty and confidentiality to his or her clients in our
legal system, they also have sometimes neglected duties as members of
the bar and officers of the court.60 In some cases, including in the Air
India trial, counsel have agreed to initial undertakings not to disclose
information to their clients. Such undertakings alter the traditional
solicitor client relationship and require the informed consent of the
client. Nevertheless, they may present a means to obtain information that
will assist in the defence of a case without risking that secrets will fall
into the hands of the affected person. Even without such undertakings,
there may be less of a risk that secrets will be inadvertently divulged if
discussions are conducted on a counsel-to-counsel basis. Although they
can be expected to share vital information with their client and take
instructions from them on vital steps of the proceedings, counsel have
independent obligations to the administration of justice. They are not in
every respect the alter ego of their client.61
Another possibility that is used in Australia and the United States is
to allow counsel the option of seeking security clearances as a way of
obtaining access to secret information. Although such a process might
60
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restrict choice of counsel and be resisted by the bar, it also has the
potential to increase the amount of information in the hands of the
counsel with the final and ultimate responsibility of defending the
affected person.
The Arar Commission’s example of independent security-cleared
commission counsel is a better model for a security-cleared counsel in
security certificate proceedings than the security-cleared amicus curiae
used by the Arar Commission. Commission counsel, unlike the amicus
curiae, had legal powers to demand full disclosure of secret material
from the government; to call and cross-examine witnesses that had
relevant information and to consult the affected parties (often through
counsel) after having seen the secret information. Although an Arar-style
amicus curiae can help ensure an adversarial challenge to governmental
claims of secrecy, such counsel is at a disadvantage with respect to
ensuring that the affected person’s full answer and defence interests are
represented in any revised security certificate process. An amicus curiae
will not generally have the power or means to ensure that the
government has made full disclosure of all relevant information or to call
and cross-examine witnesses or to consult with the affected party.
3. The Dangers of Judicial Pre-approval of Legislative Responses
The Court’s discussion of the more proportionate policy alternatives
in Charkaoui demonstrates some of the danger of judicial pre-approval
of Parliament’s response to its decision. As suggested above, the Court
seemed to have misunderstood the Arar Commission experience, and
this may have influenced Parliament’s eventual response. Its discussions
of both the SIRC experience and the Air India trial experience could
have been supplemented by fuller information. The Court also appeared
to discount the relevance of the experience under section 38 of the
Canada Evidence Act and the Air India undertakings without providing
full reasons for these conclusions.
Part of the advantage of dialogic models of constitutionalism is that
they allow the executive and the legislature to research the full range of
responses to the Court’s decision. The executive and parliamentary
committees should be able to more fully investigate the policy alternatives
to the status quo than the judiciary which is generally restrained by the
material presented to them. Judges can of course supplement the record
in a case with library research but conventions of judicial behaviour
would prohibit direct consultation with those who may have information
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about policy alternatives that cannot be found in a library. There is much
to be said for a conception of the judicial function that limits itself to
deciding whether an impugned law is constitutional and leaves to the
legislature the task of devising new laws.62 Hence, there should not be
too much judicial prompting about how the legislature should respond to
a Charter decision if the government is to be free to explore the full
range of dialogic options, including those that might not have been
anticipated or fully researched by the Court. That said, one should not be
too critical of the Court in Charkaoui. In order to justify its decisions,
courts will often have to demonstrate a range of less rights-invasive
means of satisfying the government’s policy objectives. Any court that
found the status quo with respect to security certificates to be
unconstitutional would be obliged to demonstrate that there were better
ways to reconcile the government’s interest in protecting secrets with
fairness to the accused.
The Court in Charkaoui also demonstrated that it was aware of the
major criticism of the British special advocate system when it cited the
report of the Constitutional Affairs Committee that had stressed the
disadvantages of special advocates in consulting with the affected person
once they had seen the secret material and their inability to call
witnesses or demand disclosure.63 Nevertheless, it is significant that
Parliament eventually opted for special advocates as opposed to the
independent counsel for SIRC or the Arar Commission, section 38 of the
Canada Evidence Act or the Air India trial models. In other words,
Parliament selected the only alternative that the Court recognized had
been subject to criticism and the one alternative that arguably achieves
the worst job of all the alternatives in ensuring fair treatment of the
affected person. This suggests that courts should be careful not to appear
to endorse any particular response to their Charter decisions and that the
legislature may have an incentive to pick the alternative policy response
that is the least generous to the affected individuals and the most
compatible with the interests of the government. The government has an
62
This view was articulated in several early Charter cases. Justice Dickson for example
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incentive to maximize protections of national security confidentiality,
especially in cases where the government is relying on secret intelligence
provided to Canada by more powerful allies. This tendency is if anything
stronger in the immigration law context given that non-citizens do not
have the vote and courts have traditionally accepted departures from
standards of adjudicative fairness in immigration proceedings that would
not be tolerated in criminal trials.64 Indeed the Court’s statement in
Charkaoui that “Parliament is not required to use the perfect, or the least
restrictive, alternative to achieve its objective”65 may have played a role
in encouraging the adoption of the option that the Court itself recognized
had been subject to the most criticism and was the most restrictive of the
ability of the security cleared lawyer to communicate with others after
having seen the secret information or to demand further disclosure from
the government.
4. The Need for Prompt and Continuous Review of Detention
Although the Court rejected the argument that the automatic
detention of those named in the certificate was arbitrary, it held that
delaying the review of the detention of foreign nationals until after the
reasonableness of their certificates was decided violated sections 9 and
10(c) of the Charter, especially when compared to the automatic review
within 48 hours required for permanent residents. Although courts are
loathe to second guess legislative classifications, they should not hesitate
to take a hard look at the rationale for such distinctions when liberty is at
stake. The state was not able to put forth a rationale for this differential
treatment and the Court’s remedy of applying the review provisions for
permanent residents to foreign nationals had immediate effect.66
The Court also placed considerable stress on the need for continuous
review of the detention of detainees under the security certificate regime.
The Court concluded that sections 7 and 12 of the Charter require “a
meaningful process of ongoing review that takes into account the context
and circumstances of the individual case”.67 The government will bear a
higher burden as the period of detention increases both because the
64
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danger of a person may decline and the government will have more time
to collect evidence. Although the Court does not directly address this
possibility, it is not unreasonable to conclude that long periods of
detention should place the state in a position where it should have
enough evidence to charge a person criminally or else allow the person
to be released, initially subject to conditions. The realistic possibility or
impossibility of deportation should also be a factor, but this is not
spelled out by the Court. Unfortunately, the Court avoided this issue. It
simply noted that all three applicants claimed they would be tortured if
returned to their home country but that “in each of their cases, this
remains to be proven as part of an application for protection under the
provisions of Part 2 of the IRPA. The issue of deportation to torture is
consequently not before us here”.68 Although technically correct, this
conclusion ignores the fact that all of the security certificate detainees
come from countries with poor human rights records and some come
from countries such as Syria and Egypt that are notorious for torturing
suspected terrorists. It would be unfortunate if the hopefully remote
possibility of allowing a person to be deported to a substantial risk of
torture was used as a means to preserve a tenuous nexus between
detention and deportation.
The continuing review scheme contemplated by the Court is meant
to be a demanding and robust one. For example, the Court indicated that
any requirements that the detainee present new evidence or a material
change in circumstances to justify a review would violate sections 7 and
12 of the Charter.69 The Court refused to invalidate IRPA on its face for
not placing any limits on detention or not requiring that the detention be
related to a realistic possibility of deportation. Nevertheless, it hinted
that prolonged detention could be found to violate sections 7 and 12 of
the Charter at some point in the future. The Court’s approach to the
indeterminate detention issue adopts a form of one-case-at-a-time
minimalism that Cass Sunstein has argued is particularly appropriate to
ration the use of judicial powers during emergencies.70 The Court’s onecase-at-a-time approach, however, does not maximize the space for
legislative policy-making as Sunstein suggests that it should. Rather, it
leaves the existing legislation intact but uncertain as both detainees and
governments wait and speculate about the particular point of time in
68
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which courts will conclude that detention has become constitutionally
excessive. At that point of time, the courts will fashion a case-specific
remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter while leaving the constitutional
scheme intact.
5. The Court’s Conclusion on Equality Rights
The Court’s summary dismissal of the detainees’ equality rights
claims is disappointing, especially when compared to the House of Lords
approach to equality in the Belmarsh case.71 The Supreme Court’s
rationale for holding that there is no equality violation was its assertion
that, unlike citizens, non-citizens do not have an independent right to
remain in Canada under section 6 of the Charter coupled with the
Court’s statement that detention has not yet “become unhinged from the
state’s purpose of deportation”.72 The Court’s justification is presumably
its conclusion that none of the three applicants had reached the point
where it has been determined that they were in need of protection from a
substantial risk of torture if deported.73 But at least with respect to
Hassan Almrei who was born in Syria, it would be shocking if a
substantial risk of torture was not found. If this is accepted, the only
possible connection between Mr. Almrei’s continued detention and the
unique immigration remedy of deportation is the possible use of the
Suresh exception.
The Court’s summary dismissal of the equality claim also avoided
comparing the long-term indeterminate detention of non-citizens
suspected of involvement with terrorism with the more limited tools
available to the state with respect to citizens suspected of involvement
with terrorism. Those charged with terrorism offences have Charter
rights to a trial in a reasonable time and not to be denied reasonable bail
without just cause. They have broad rights to disclosure of relevant
information held by the state, subject only to non-disclosure applications
under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act which, as the Court noted,
does not allow the use of secret evidence. Section 38.14 of the CEA also
allows a trial judge to fashion whatever remedy is necessary to protect
the accused’s right to a fair trial because of the non-disclosure of secret
71
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information. Citizens can be subject to peace bond provisions under
section 810.01 of the Criminal Code or the now-expired preventive
arrest provisions of section 83.3, but only for a year.74 The Court did not
conduct a full section 15 analysis, which would have required it to select
a comparator group or reflect on the position of non-citizens suspected
of terrorism.
The Court’s summary conclusion that section 15 was not violated
precluded it from examining under section 1 of the Charter whether the
singling out of non-citizens suspected of terrorism for harsher treatment
under IRPA compared to the criminal law could be justified under
section 1 of the Charter. Such an analysis would have required the Court
to address questions of rational connection, proportionality and overall
balance between the treatment of non-citizens and the important objective
of preventing terrorism. Such an analysis would have raised some
difficult questions about the use of immigration law as anti-terrorism
law. The legislative objective for any section 15 violation would likely
have been the need to protect the security of Canada whereas the
legislative objective that was used to determine whether the denial of a
fair hearing under section 7 could be justified under section 1 of the
Charter was the state’s need for secrecy, not security. The House of
Lords in the Belmarsh case focused on the legislative objective of
security as a possible justification for the differential treatment of noncitizens. It concluded that there was not even a rational connection
between the prevention of terrorism and the singling out of non-citizens
suspected of terrorism. The House of Lords also raised questions about
the utility of deportation as a tool in the fight against international
terrorism.75 Even if the Court in Charkaoui had deferred on the rational
connection issue, it still would have had to grapple with whether
criminal prosecutions were a more proportionate means for the state to
protect itself against non-citizens involved with terrorist organizations
than reliance on security certificates that in these cases were only
tenuously tied to the possibility of deportation. The important issues of
whether the use of immigration law as anti-terrorism law was rational
and proportionate were avoided in Charkaoui because of the Court’s
blunt conclusion that no section 15 violation had been established. The
absence of proportionality analysis on security issues may also help
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explain why Parliament’s ultimate response to Charkaoui did not explore
the long-term sustainability of security certificates as anti-terrorism law.
6. The Court’s Remedy
The Court delayed for 12 months its declaration of invalidity with
respect to those parts of the legislation that authorized the government to
make unchallenged ex parte representations to the Court.76 Although the
Court did not cite the Schachter v. Canada77 categories for when it will
be appropriate to suspend a declaration of invalidity, it is reasonably
certain that they applied the public danger category given the Court’s
conclusion that the signing of a certificate constituted a determination of
dangerousness. The Court indicated that the unconstitutional provisions
could be applied during the 12-month delay, but that at the end of this
time
the certificates of Mr. Harkat and Mr. Almrei (and of any other
individuals whose certificates have been deemed reasonable) will lose
the “reasonable” status that has been conferred on them, and it will be
open to them to apply to have the certificates quashed. If the government
intends to employ a certificate after the one-year delay, it will need to
seek a fresh determination of reasonableness under the new process
devised by Parliament. Likewise, any detention review occurring after
the delay will be subject to the new process.78

The Court’s choice of a 12-month delay might reflect its judgment
about the minimal amount of time that was necessary to devise and enact
new legislation. A six-month delay might have been an unrealistically
short time to allow the government to draft legislation and to allow
Parliament to debate it. That said, the government kept most of its work
internal until eight months after the decision when Bill C-3 was given
first reading. There was then a rushed parliamentary debate with the
threat of the expiry of the Court’s suspension of its declaration of
invalidity hanging over the heads of the Parliamentarians. There is a
tension in the dialogical model between giving legislatures enough time
to respond to court judgments and minimizing the period of time during
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which individuals suffer the effects of unconstitutional laws.79 An 18month suspension would have given Parliament more time to debate its
response, but it would also have increased the harms to the detainees
who were detained under a law that had been found to be unconstitutional.
It is also possible that government could have taken even longer before
introducing its bill had an 18-month suspension been used.
Some might question why a suspended declaration of invalidity was
used at all.80 In this case, the detainees received no immediate benefit
from their victory in Court and this is certainly contrary to traditional
declaratory approaches associated with Blackstone and Dicey which
stress the connection between rights and remedies and generally produce
retroactive remedies or at least remedies that have immediate prospective
effect.81 It can be argued that detention under an unconstitutional law is
in direct conflict with the direction in section 52 of the Constitution Act,
1982 that unconstitutional laws are of no force and effect. That said, it
may be unrealistic to expect the courts to take responsibility for the
release of individuals that the government claims are dangerous. In this
vein, it is significant that the House of Lords in its justly celebrated
Belmarsh case also employed a remedy that did not result in the release
of the detainees. Although it may have been unrealistic to have expected
the Court to have struck down the law and ordered the release of those
detained under it, the Court might have done more to minimize the harm
caused to the successful applicants during the one year in which the
declaration of invalidity was suspended.
One way of resolving the tension between giving Parliament adequate
time for deliberation and minimizing harms to those detained under an
unconstitutional law is for the Court to take supervisory steps to limit the
harms to the successful applicants during the period of suspension. For
example, an independent lawyer who already had a security clearance
might have been allowed to see the secret evidence in the cases and to
challenge the government’s claims of secrecy. This may have led to
more information being made available to the detainees and their
lawyers even while the declaration of invalidity was suspended. Another
possibility was expedited review of the conditions of release of detainees.
79
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Unfortunately, no steps were taken in this case to minimize the harms of
the unconstitutional law during the 12 months that the Court’s remedy
was suspended.
There is a danger that an emphasis on dialogue between courts and
legislatures may result in the affected individuals getting lost in the
institutional interplay. The Court’s judgment does not even provide basic
details about the three men including the lengthy periods of detention
and complex procedural history of their cases, the allegations that they
face, or their countries of origin to which they face deportation. The
Court may have been reluctant to say much about the detainees because
it was not privy to the secret evidence that the government presented
against the men and the secret evidence had never been subject to
adversarial challenge. Nevertheless, courts should attempt to tell the
public about all litigants who appear before them. Courts should also
recognize that a large part of the justification for their role in institutional
dialogue is the unique ability of courts to render justice to aggrieved
litigants who cannot find relief from other branches of government.
7. Summary
The Court’s unanimous decision in Charkaoui is far from the
unambiguous victory for the detainees that it was initially presented as in
the media. The Court’s treatment of equality issues and its deferral of the
issue of the ultimate constitutionality of indeterminate detention was
troubling. The Court never really answered the question of why longterm detention without trial and secret evidence was acceptable when
applied against non-citizens when they would be unacceptable if applied
to citizens. The Court’s use of one-case-at-a-time constitutional minimalism
on the indeterminate detention issue ignored the long periods of
detention already suffered by the detainees and the difficulties of
deporting them without a substantial risk of torture. It sent the message
that the government could continue to detain these men until at some
time in the future, some judge declares that enough is enough. The Court
never grappled with the (ir)rationality of using immigration law with its
ultimate and problematic remedy of deportation as anti-terrorism law, as
did the House of Lords in its Belmarsh case.82
The Court made a firm statement about the need for adversarial
challenge to the state’s case in order to satisfy the principles of
82
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fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter. On the issue of both
justification under section 1 of the Charter and the ultimate remedy, the
Court deferred to Parliament by simply outlining a range of less rightsintrusive alternatives. Although it was necessary for the Court to justify
its decision that the present system of no adversarial challenge was
unconstitutional, such surveys must be conducted with care lest the
Court misunderstand the policy alternatives or appear to pre-approve any
particular alternative. The Court’s use of a suspended declaration of
invalidity allowed Parliament to make policy choices and enact Bill C-3,
but it did not guarantee that Bill C-3 or other aspects of security
certificates will not be found to violate the Charter in future cases.83 The
Court’s judgment started a process that will marginally improve the
fairness of the security certificate process, but it rejected many of the
other claims made by the applicants including their claims of unequal
and discriminatory treatment when compared with the treatment received
by citizens suspected of involvement in terrorism. The Court also did not
place any limits on the indeterminate detention of the applicants or reject
the possibility that they might be deported even if they faced a substantial
risk of torture.

III. THE LIMITED DIALOGIC RESPONSE IN BILL C-3
In October 2007, the government introduced Bill C-3 providing for
special advocates but only for use with respect to immigration law
security certificates. As will be discussed below, the government did not
follow the advice of both House of Commons and Senate committees
that had recommended a wider use of special advocates whenever the
government used secret evidence as well as in the ex parte part of
proceedings under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act to obtain nondisclosure orders. The fact that Bill C-3 only authorized the use of
special advocates under IRPA was indicative of a general failure of Bill
C-3 to expand the policy debate with the Court. The Court had only
decided the issue under the IRPA and Parliament responded in a similar
narrow manner.
83
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1. The Role of Special Advocates
The special advocates contemplated in Bill C-3 are in some respects
closer to the Arar commission’s model of amicus curiae than the role of
Commission counsel during the Arar Commission or the role of
independent counsel for SIRC. Bill C-3 defines the duties of special
advocates as follows:
85.1(1) A special advocate’s role is to protect the interests of the
permanent resident or foreign national in a proceeding under any of
sections 78 and 82 to 82.2 when information or other evidence is heard
in the absence of the public and of the permanent resident or foreign
national and their counsel.
(2) A special advocate may challenge
(a) the Minister’s claim that the disclosure of information or other
evidence would be injurious to national security or endanger
the safety of any person; and
(b) the relevance, reliability and sufficiency of information or
other evidence that is provided by the Minister and is not
disclosed to the permanent resident or foreign national and
their counsel, and the weight to be given to it.
.....
85.2 A special advocate may
(a) make oral and written submissions with respect to the
information and other evidence that is provided by the
Minister and is not disclosed to the permanent resident or
foreign national and their counsel;
(b) participate in, and cross-examine witnesses who testify
during, any part of the proceeding that is held in the absence
of the public and of the permanent resident or foreign national
and their counsel; and
(c) exercise, with the judge’s authorization, any other powers that
are necessary to protect the interests of the permanent resident
or foreign national.84

The Minister is only obliged to disclose the secret evidence that is
presented to the judge.85 The special advocate can challenge both the
84
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government’s claim to secrecy and the relevance, reliability and sufficiency
of the secret evidence.
2. Section 85.2(c) and Additional Powers that are Necessary to
Protect the Detainee
Section 85.2(c) will be critical in determining whether the special
advocate has a role similar to that played by the Arar Commission’s
amicus curiae or the more robust role played by Arar Commission
counsel or SIRC counsel. It is under subsection (c) that a judge will
decide whether the special advocate can consult with the detainee and
his counsel after having seen the secret information presented by the
Minister and whether the special advocate will be able to demand the
disclosure of evidence possessed by the Minister or call witnesses.
Although the requirement for judicial authorization was designed in part
to respond to the risk of inadvertent disclosure of the secret information,
the only statutory criteria in section 85.2(c) is whether a requested power
is “necessary to protect the interests of the permanent resident or foreign
national”. This in itself is a fairly stringent standard that requires the
judge to conclude that the requested power is necessary and not just
advisable in order to protect the interests of the non-citizen.
The ability of the special advocate to consult with the detainee or
other experts about the secret information, as well as the special
advocate’s ability to demand further disclosure and call witnesses, can
be critical to protecting the interests and defending the detainee. The
proposed legislation essentially delegates the questions of whether the
special advocate will be able to play such a role to the specially
designated judge of the Federal Court who hears the case. Such
delegation may allow the courts to expand the role of the special
advocate in ways not specifically contemplated by Parliament if the
judge determines that the new functions of the special advocate are
necessary to protect the interests of the detainee. At the same time,
presiding judges might take a restrictive view of what is necessary to
protect the interests of the detainee. An important issue will be whether
the judge’s perceptions of the risks of inadvertent disclosure of secret
information influences his or her approach to determining what is
necessary to protect the detainee’s interests. Such an approach would run
contrary to the wording of the text and ignore the Court’s observation in
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Charkaoui86 that with respect to the SIRC process that “there is no
indication that these procedures increased the risk of disclosure of
protected information”. At the same time, there are other parts of Bill C3 which signal a concern about the risk of inadvertent disclosure of
information. Section 83(1.2) provides that a judge could deny a detainee’s
request for a specific special advocate because the special advocate
already has had access to information that would be injurious to national
security or endanger the safety of a person and in the circumstances
“[t]here is a risk of inadvertent disclosure of that information or other
evidence”. This provision seems to discount the fact that security cleared
counsel who have acted for both SIRC and Arar Commission were able
to interact with affected people without inadvertently disclosing secret
information.
The Commons committee that conducted the three-year review of
the Anti-terrorism Act considered the practice of the Arar Commission
during which Commission counsel with security clearances consulted
with counsel for Mr. Arar and special security-cleared counsel challenged
the government’s case for secrecy. As the Commons committee noted,
“The functions performed by the amicus curiae were somewhat different
[than those of Commisson counsel]. During in camera hearings, he was
mandated to make submissions challenging the national security
confidentiality claims made by government agencies in opposition to the
public disclosure of sensitive information. His function was to advocate
in favour of accountability and transparency in the public interest.”87 The
Senate committee specifically recommended that “[t]hat the special
advocate be able to communicate with the party affected by the proceedings,
and his or her counsel, after receiving confidential information and
attending in camera hearings, and that the government establish clear
guidelines and policies to ensure the secrecy of information in the
interest of national security”.88 The Senate committee’s approach built on
Canada’s experience with security-cleared lawyers conferring with the
affected person both during the Arar commission and during the process
that was used by the Security Intelligence Review Commission to review
security certificates.
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Parliament’s delegation of the most critical issues to Federal Court
judges casts some doubt on those who argue that judicial activism is a
power grab by the judges and their supporters.89 The reasons for
increased judicial power in modern societies are more complicated.
Delegation of tough issues to the courts can avoid debate and conflict
when legislation is being enacted. The fact that Bill C-3 was enacted just
as the 12-month suspension of the declaration of invalidity was about to
expire may have given the government an incentive to make the reply
legislation as uncontroversial as possible. In addition, the delegation of
these issues to the Federal Court could be attractive because it can be
assumed that the court’s decisions will establish and follow relevant but
perhaps unclear constitutional standards. Even if the presiding judge
denies a special advocate an opportunity to contact the detainee or obtain
further disclosure when such actions are required to ensure that the
detainees’ right to know and challenge the case are satisfied, the eventual
remedy for any violation of section 7 of the Charter will be limited to the
facts of the particular case and not result in a wholesale invalidation of
the act. In this respect, Bill C-3 is a legislative mirror of the one-case-ata-time orientation of the judicial minimalism advocated by Cass Sunstein.
3. The Broad Restrictions Placed on Special Advocates After They
Have Examined the Secret Evidence
The restrictions imposed on the special advocate after having seen
the secret information that the Minister presents to the judge apply not
only to consultation with the detainee and his lawyers, but to all other
persons. Section 85.4(2) provides that “After that information or other
evidence is received by the special advocate, the special advocate may,
during the remainder of the proceeding, communicate with another
person about the proceeding only with the judge’s authorization and
subject to any conditions that the judge considers appropriate.” Read by
itself this provision is overbroad because it could restrict the special
advocate from communicating about non-secret parts of the proceedings
with other persons or from communicating with other special advocates
or others with security clearances about the proceedings. The ability of
special advocates to make effective adversarial challenge to secret
intelligence that may draw on foreign events and the methods of foreign
89
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intelligence agencies will be undercut if section 85.4(2) is interpreted to
require a special advocate to function in splendid isolation once he or
she has seen the secret information.
Section 85.5 provides a somewhat better tailored restriction on what
the special advocate can reveal. It provides:
85.5 With the exception of communications authorized by a judge,
no person shall
(a) disclose information or other evidence that is disclosed to
them under section 85.4 and that is treated as confidential by
the judge presiding at the proceeding; or
(b) communicate with another person about the content of any
part of a proceeding under any of sections 78 and 82 to 82.2
that is heard in the absence of the public and of the permanent
resident or foreign national and their counsel.

This provision seeks only to restrain the special advocate with respect to
confidential information and information that is heard in the absence of
the public and the affected party. Nevertheless, thought should be given
to how a special advocate can obtain appropriate legal and factual
assistance once the special advocate has been exposed to the secret
information. It may be too much to assume that a single special advocate,
or even two special advocates working together on a file,90 will be able
on their own and without assistance to discharge the burden articulated
in Charkaoui of providing effective adversarial challenge to the
government’s case. The Court has underlined the importance of someone
bringing to the attention of the reviewing judge all the relevant facts and
laws. This process may in some cases require the special advocate to
consult with others about the accuracy, reliability, relevance and
significance of the secret information. In some cases, only the affected
person may hold the clue to relevant facts that could rebut the secret
evidence or at least place it in a fuller context. In other cases, the special
advocate may need to consult experts on terrorism and geo-political
events in order to put the intelligence into its full context. An
intelligence report that may on first glance appear to be damming may
appear significantly less so if the reliability of the underlying information
is suspect or when reliable information is placed in its full context.
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The special advocate will challenge both the government’s claim
that information cannot be disclosed to the detainee and any secret
evidence presented by the Minister to the reviewing judge. As discussed
above, both of these challenges can serve important functions. A special
advocate with experience in matters concerning national security
confidentiality could effectively challenge overbroad claims of secrecy.
At the same time, the government may still have the upper hand with
respect to claims that the disclosure of information will harm relations to
allies, secret informers or ongoing investigations. Even an experienced
special advocate may be at a disadvantage in challenging the reliability
of secret evidence or placing the secret evidence in context. The special
advocate can interview the detainee before seeing the secret information.
At that point in time, however, there is a danger that the special advocate
will not ask the right questions. Although special advocates are skilled
lawyers with experience with matters affecting national security
confidentiality, they will not generally be experts about the countries in
which detainees are alleged to have supported or engaged in terrorism. If
after receiving the secret information, the special advocate wants to
return and ask the detainee more questions, or even if the special
advocate wants to ask a third-party expert for assistance, the special
advocate must seek the permission of the judge. Without such assistance,
the special advocate may be unable to present to the reviewing judge
facts that are necessary to make an accurate determination of whether the
detainee is a threat to the security of Canada.
4. The Need for the Special Advocates to be Able to Make Ex Parte
Representations under Section 85.2(c)
The special advocate may be reluctant to seek permission to consult
the detainee or others after having seen the secret information if such a
process means that his or her work product will be revealed to the
government. Under section 38.11(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, those
opposing the Attorney General’s attempt to obtain non-disclosure orders
can have ex parte hearings granted by the Federal Court judge. This
process has the potential of allowing an accused to inform the judge of
the accused’s line of defence without revealing such information to the
Attorney General of Canada or those who are prosecuting the case. The
Federal Court has repeatedly stressed the utility of this provision in
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making the court aware of the affected person’s concerns.91
Unfortunately, there is no such provision in Bill C-3 that would allow
special advocates to seek permission from the presiding judge on an ex
parte basis to consult the detainee, the detainee’s lawyers or other
experts.92 The prospect of alerting the government to their lines of
inquiry and their internal work product or simply their lack of
knowledge about the political context of the intelligence may deter
special advocates from seeking permission from the judge to obtain
more information from the detainee and from experts.
The government may argue that they must be informed so that they
can make submissions with respect to the harms to national security and
the risk of inadvertent disclosure. In many cases, however, the harms of
disclosure to national security will be obvious and acknowledged by all
parties. The presiding judges will already have heard and accepted
adversarial argument from the government about the harm to national
security or other persons that prevents the disclosure of the information
to the detainee and his lawyer. It is difficult to see what the government
can add with respect to the risk of inadvertent disclosure or to the best
way for the special advocate to conduct him- or herself after seeing the
secret information. The government was not able to make such
adversarial arguments when counsel for SIRC or the Arar Commission
asked questions of the affected persons after having seen the secret
information. With respect to the risk of inadvertent disclosure of
information, there may be no alternative to relying on the discretion and
the integrity of security-cleared counsel in this area. In any event, the
prospect of full notice to the government when special advocates seek
judicial authorization under section 85.2(c) may inhibit special advocates
from seeking additional powers.
5. The Role of Special Advocates in Challenging the Reliability and
Relevance of the Secret Evidence
Under section 85.1(2) of Bill C-3, the special advocate can challenge
“the relevance, reliability and sufficiency” of the information provided
91
Canada (Attorney General) v. Ribic, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1964, 2003 FCA 246 (Fed. C.A.);
Canada (Attorney General) v. Khawaja, [2007] F.C.J. No. 622, 2007 FC 490 (F.C.) [hereinafter
“Khawaja”], revd on other grounds [2007] F.C.J. No. 1473, 2007 FCA 342 (F.C.A.).
92
As a practical matter, the Attorney General of Canada would likely obtain notice of
requests for further disclosure from the government, but the same cannot be said about requests to
interview the detainee, his lawyer or other experts.
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by the Minister. The reference to challenging the relevance of the
information is particularly interesting. It opens up the possibility that the
special advocate can argue that intelligence about a person’s associations
— indeed the very type of information that was at the heart of the Arar
matter — is of limited or no relevance. It follows from a recommendation
that was made by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association93 to
the committees conducting the three-year review, but one that was
rejected by the committees. Intelligence may be based on assumptions
and presumptions of guilt that would be rejected under more disciplined
evidentiary thinking requiring that the probative value of evidence be
identified, that irrelevant evidence be excluded and that the prejudicial
effect of evidence be balanced against its probative value.94 The practical
meaning of the reference to challenging the relevance of secret evidence
may, however, be undercut by section 83(h) which provides:
(h) the judge may receive into evidence anything that, in the judge’s
opinion, is reliable and appropriate, even if it is inadmissible in a court
of law, and may base a decision on that evidence.
(Emphasis added)

In other words, the special advocate is mandated to make submissions
about the relevance of the information, but the judge is only mandated to
determine whether the evidence is “reliable and appropriate”. Section
83(j), however, contemplates that the judge shall return irrelevant material
to the Minister by providing:
(j) the judge shall not base a decision on information or other evidence
provided by the Minister, and shall return it to the Minister, if the judge
determines that it is not relevant or if the Minister withdraws it.

It remains to be seen whether these changes will move security certificates
away from an intelligence-based paradigm to a more evidence-based
paradigm. On an evidence-based paradigm, a reviewing judge could
conclude that intelligence revealing that a detainee has strong and perhaps
extreme religious or political views and associations with extremists may
be of questionable relevance to the ultimate issue of whether the detainee
is a threat to national security. There is, however, no guarantee that the
93

I disclose that I am a member of the board of directors of that organization. I was also a
member of the research advisory committee for Part II of the Arar Commission and have provided
training for special advocates.
94
See Gus Van Harten, “Charkaoui and Secret Evidence” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 251.
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reviewing judges will take this approach and they could define relevance
in a broad manner and rarely, if ever, send information back to the
government on the ground that it was irrelevant. The specially
designated judges of the Federal Court who review security certificates
have experience with seeing secret intelligence and it remains to be seen
how this experience will affect their determinations of relevance. That
said, section 83(j) is a new and mandatory provision that should be given
a generous and purposive interpretation. It seems intended to discipline
the type of information that is used to support security certificates and to
ensure that irrelevant but prejudicial intelligence about the detainees is
not considered by the reviewing judge and is returned to the Minister.
6. The Role of the Special Advocate in Challenging Secret Evidence
Obtained as a Result of Torture or Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment
Bill C-3 to its credit enters into the torture debate by providing in
section 83(1.1) that “reliable and appropriate evidence does not include
information that is believed on reasonable grounds to have been obtained
as a result of the use of torture within the meaning of section 269.1 of
the Criminal Code, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment within the meaning of the Convention Against Torture”.
Parliament has chosen a fairly broad prohibition on evidence derived
from torture that does not on its face contemplate an exception for
derivative evidence that is obtained from an independent source.
In addition to statements and derivative evidence obtained from
torture, section 83(1.1) also prohibits the use of statements and derivative
evidence obtained as a result of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment
or punishment. These conditions can include detention without basic
amenities, prolonged isolation, restraints in very painful conditions,
sleep deprivation for prolonged periods, threats and exposure to loud
music for prolonged periods.95 This provision will give both the detainees’
lawyers and special advocates resources to challenge much intelligence
received from countries with poor human rights records as well as some
intelligence received from American agencies.96 This provision takes a
strong and appropriate legislative stand against evidence obtained as a
95
Craig Forcese, National Security Law: Canadian Practice in International Perspective
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008), at 597-601.
96
See Forcese & Waldman, supra, note 74.
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result of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. It raises
questions about the viability of cases against detainees that may rely on
intelligence supplied by countries prepared to use harsh interrogation
techniques and impose harsh conditions of confinement.
The provisions which allow special advocates to challenge secret
intelligence on the basis that it is irrelevant, unreliable or obtained as a
result of torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment have a potential
to put the whole process of intelligence gathering on trial. Depending on
the receptivity of the judges to such claims, these provisions may have
far-reaching and perhaps unintended effects. They could be as important
to the security certificate regime as the exclusion of improperly obtained
evidence is to the criminal justice system. If the reviewing judges are
willing to exclude a significant portion of the secret intelligence that is
presented to them because of concerns about its relevance and reliability,
these evidentiary challenges could shake the sustainability of security
certificates, apart from other challenges based on indeterminate detention
and deportation to torture which will be examined in the third part of this
essay.
7. The Equal Treatment of Permanent Residents and other NonCitizens: Dialogue or Obedience?
Bill C-3 followed the Supreme Court’s Charkaoui decision by
providing that non-citizens who do not have permanent resident status
should have the same right to prompt initial judicial review of detention
as permanent residents. In other words both permanent residents and
foreign nationals have a right to judicial review of their initial detention
within 48 hours of the detention.97 Some would argue that such a
response should not be characterized as dialogue between Parliament
and the Court but rather as the obedience of Parliament to the Court.98
There are, however, some instances when there is simply not a wide
range of policy choices. This part of the legislative reply codifies the
Court’s immediate remedy in Charkaoui and is justified because the
Supreme Court found the distinction between the treatment of permanent
residents and other non-citizens for the purpose of reviewing detention
was arbitrary and could not be justified in relation to any specific
97

S.C. 2008, c. 3, s. 82(1).
Christopher Manfredi & James Kelly, “Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg
and Bushell” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 513.
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governmental purpose. If the government had a legitimate purpose for
such a distinction and could justify differential treatment of permanent
residents and other non-citizens for the purposes of the initial review of
their detention, it could have enacted and defended a differential regime.
Even when legislatures appear to follow the dictates of Court
decisions, however, they retain the ability to place subtle yet sometimes
important qualifications into the new legislation. For example, Parliament’s
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Duarte99 that judicial
warrants were required when a person “wears a wire” by engaging in
electronic surveillance of another person included not only the provision
of new warrants, but also explicit legislative authorization for the use of
warrantless wires in some limited circumstances.100 Bill C-3 follows this
trend of following the gist of the Court’s decision while introducing a
subtle yet potentially important difference in the new legislation. Bill
C-3 provides for judicial review of detention under security certificates
every six months, yet effectively extends the period between such
judicial reviews by calculating the six-month period as only starting after
the completion of the previous judicial review.101 Depending on the time
that the parties and the judge spends on conducting and completing the
review, the result could be a significant extension of the periods between
judicial review.102 The merits of this change are not clear, but the
institutional point is that even when the legislature may appear to obey a
court decision, it retains the ability to introduce potentially significant
variations in new legislation.
8. Recognition of House Arrest as an Alternative to Detention
Although Bill C-3 can be characterized as a truncated form of
dialogue because it only provides special advocates for security
certificate proceedings and because it delegates the toughest issues
concerning the role of special advocates to the reviewing judge, it
expands the policy debate about security certificates in some respects.
For example, it builds on the practice of Federal Court judges granting
those subject to long-term detention under security certificates conditional
99

[1990] S.C.J. No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.).
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 184.1 (warrantless wires authorized to prevent
bodily harm); s. 184.4 (warrantless wires authorized in exceptional circumstances).
101
S.C. 2008, c. 3, s. 82(3) and (4) and s. 82.1(2) and s. 82.2(4).
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release. It does so by providing for arrest powers if the conditions of
release are breached103 and by providing for six-month judicial reviews
of the conditions of release.104 The practice of release under conditions
was encouraged by the Supreme Court in Charkaoui which interpreted
the relevant schemes “as enabling the judge to consider whether any
danger attendant on release can be mitigated by conditions”.105 The Court
also provided a general list of factors that the judge should consider
including the reasons for detention, length of detention, reasons for the
delay in deportation and anticipated future length of detention. In Bill
C-3, Parliament was content to leave these matters, as well as the range
of conditions that can be placed on security certificate detainees, to
judicial discretion even though in other contexts including bail, the
legislature provides judges with more guidance.
Section 82(5) requires that a person be detained if their release under
conditions would harm national security, endanger the safety of any
person or if they would be likely to abscond.106 The same section is,
however, silent on the criteria to be used to determine the conditions of
release.107 The conditions of house arrest imposed on the security
certificate detainees has not surprisingly attracted a tremendous amount of
litigation, and some of the conditions are quite harsh. For example, Mr.
Harkat is subject to house arrest with only limited trips allowed outside
the house and with all places and visits being vetted by the Canadian
Border Services Agency.108 He has been found in breach of some
conditions.109 The British legislation that responds to the House of Lords’
103

S.C. 2008, c.3, s. 82.1.
Id., s. 82.2.
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Charkaoui, [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, at para. 120 (S.C.C.).
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Detention on the basis of injury to the vague and broad notion of “national security”
underlines the difference between the immigration and criminal processes where the denial of bail
when it is in the “public interest” was found to violate the right of a person charged with an offence
not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause. R. v. Morales, [1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3
S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.). But see R. v. Hall, [2002] S.C.J. No. 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.)
upholding a reformulated tertiary ground for the denial of bail on the basis of concerns about public
confidence in the justice system.
107
There is reference in s. 82.1(1) to changing conditions of release if it is “desirable
because of a material change in the circumstances that led to the order” but no statement of the
criteria that should be used in ordering or varying the conditions of release. Nor are criteria found
for confirming a release order or varying the conditions of release under s. 82.2 after a person has
been arrested and detained for breaching the conditions of release.
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Harkat v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] F.C.J. No. 540,
2007 FC 416 (F.C.).
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Belmarsh decision provided more guidance regarding the content of
control orders.110 That said, the British legislation has not prevented
extensive litigation over the content of the control orders.111 The
conditions imposed on security certificate detainees may, like bail
conditions, inevitably be a topic for frequent judicial review.
9. Recognition of Limited Appeals
Bill C-3 also provides for a limited appeal from a judge’s
determination that a security certificate is reasonable or from a detention
review. The right of appeal is limited to a question that the presiding
judge certifies as “a serious question of general importance”.112 This
process is much more limited than granting a full right of appeal. This
provision cannot be characterized as a dialogic response to the Court’s
ruling because the Court in Charkaoui113 rejected the argument that the
Charter and the rule of law require an appeal. Nevertheless, the provision
110

Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (U.K.), c. 2, s. 1(3): “The obligations that may be
imposed by a control order made against an individual are any obligations that the Secretary of State
or (as the case may be) the court considers necessary for purposes connected with preventing or
restricting involvement by that individual in terrorism-related activity.” Sections 1(4)(a)-(p) and (5)(8) extensively characterize what the content of such obligations may include: for example,
reporting and monitoring requirements and restrictions on movement, association, communication
and possession of certain articles; prohibitions in respect of occupation; requirements that access or
consent to search or seize be provided to the person’s residence or other places; and a requirement
that the person provide certain information (for example, information about proposed movements or
activities). Reasonable grounds for suspecting involvement with terrorism-related activity are
required, and the decision that there are such grounds is subject to judicial review. An order can be
revoked or relaxed at any time, modified on consent, or modified where the Secretary of State or the
court considers the modification necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting
involvement by the controlled person in terrorism-related activity: s. 7.
111
See, for example, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. J.J., [2007] UKHL 45
(U.K.H.L.); Secretary of State v. E, [2007] UKHL 47, [2008] A.C. 499 (U.K.H.L.); Secretary of
State v. M.B. (F.C.), [2007] UKHL 46 (U.K.H.L.).
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S.C. 2008, c. 3, s. 82.3.
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The Court concluded:
… there is no constitutional right to an appeal (Kourtessis v. M.N.R., [1993] 2 S.C.R.
53); nor can such a right be said to flow from the rule of law in this context. The Federal
Court is a superior court, not an administrative tribunal: Federal Courts Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. F-7, s. 4. Federal Court judges, when reviewing certificates under the IRPA,
have all the powers of Federal Court judges and exercise their powers judicially.
Moreover, the Federal Court of Appeal has reinforced the legality of the process by
holding that it is appropriate to circumvent the s. 80(3) privative clause where the
constitutionality of legislation is challenged (Charkaoui (Re), 2004 FCA 421, at paras.
47-50) or where the named person alleges bias on the part of the designated judge
(Zündel, Re (2004), 331 N.R. 180, 2004 FCA 394).
Charkaoui, supra, note 105, at para. 136.
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reveals how Parliament retains the ability to deny and shape appeal
rights. Indeed, the provision harkens back to pre-Charter traditions when
Parliament reformed appeals from jury acquittals and capital punishment
even in the face of Court decisions that the existing provisions did not
violate the Canadian Bill of Rights.
10. Release to Permit Departure from Canada
The Supreme Court in Charkaoui considered the possibility of
release of a detainee to allow their departure from Canada, but was not
optimistic that this constituted a realistic remedy in these cases. The
Court stated:
The Federal Court suggested that Mr. Almrei “holds the key to his
release”: Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2004] 4 F.C.R. 327, 2004 FC 420, at para. 138. But voluntary
departure may be impossible. A person named in a certificate of
inadmissibility may have nowhere to go. Other countries may assume
such a person to be a terrorist and are likely to refuse entry, or the
person may fear torture on his or her return. Deportation may fail for
the same reasons, despite the observation that “[i]n our jurisdiction, at
this moment, deportation to torture remains a possibility” in exceptional
circumstances: Almrei, 2005 FCA 54, at para. 127. The only realistic
option may be judicial release.114

Despite these comments, Bill C-3 allows the Minister to authorize the
release of a detainee to permit their departure from Canada.115 It is
possible that this provision could be used in situations where the
detainee cannot be returned to their country of origin because of
concerns that they will be tortured, but where some third country agrees
to accept the person. This provision demonstrates Parliament’s ability to
pursue policy options even in the face of skepticism from the Court
about whether they are viable.
11. Summary
Bill C-3 responded to the specific flaws in security certificates that
were found to exist in Charkaoui. Parliament has taken the narrow
lesson of Charkaoui seriously and provided for adversarial challenge to
114
115

Id., at para. 99.
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the secret intelligence used to support security certificates. In doing so,
Parliament has opted for the one example of adversarial challenge to
secret information — the special advocate system — that the Supreme
Court in Charkaoui recognized had been criticized. Parliament has opted
for a special advocate system that attempts to limit the risk of inadvertent
disclosure of secret information by requiring judicial permission and
supervision of the ability of the special advocate to contact others after
having seen the secret information as opposed to a system that follows
the SIRC or Arar Commission model and relies on the integrity and
ingenuity of security cleared counsel in ensuring that secrets are not
inadvertently disclosed when they discuss matters with the affected party
and their counsel. Parliament also chose not to follow the model of
section 38 of the CEA that would allow judges to balance the harms of
disclosure of secret information against the harms caused to the affected
person by non-disclosure. Parliament has responded to Charkaoui, but in
a manner that maximizes its policy interests in secrecy while at the same
time still allowing some adversarial challenge to the secret information.
Finally, Parliament has deferred many of the important procedural
details about how the special advocate system will operate to the
decisions of the Federal Court judges who preside at security certificate
hearings.
Bill C-3 slightly expands the policy debate because it goes beyond
the narrow issue of adversarial challenge and addresses some other
important issues including prohibiting evidence obtained by torture and
other forms of cruel and degrading treatment and allowing the reviewing
judge to send irrelevant information back to the Minister. These provisions
have the potential to result in the exclusion of secret information that
could have been accepted and used by the reviewing judges before the
enactment of Bill C-3. Bill C-3 implicitly recognizes the practice of
releasing security certificate detainees under strict house arrest
conditions, and it allows some limited appeals.116 Although Bill C-3 goes
somewhat beyond a response to Charkaoui, it leaves unanswered many
important issues about both security certificates and the treatment of
secret information.

116
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IV. THE TRUNCATED DIALOGIC RESPONSE OF BILL C-3
Bill C-3 will not end the dialogue between courts and legislatures
about either security certificates or the treatment of secret information.
To some extent, it may be inevitable that there are many outstanding
issues still to be resolved. The treatment of those who cannot be
deported because of concerns that they will be tortured and the treatment
of secret evidence that cannot be disclosed are two of the most difficult
issues that arise in anti-terrorism law and policy.117 There are no easy
answers. That said, however, both the Court and Parliament could have
decided more in this episode of dialogue. As suggested above, the Court
avoided grappling with the equality implications of security certificates
and the questions that a section 1 analysis would have raised about the
rationality and proportionality of using immigration law as anti-terrorism
law. It also deferred and finessed the issue of when indeterminate
detention will become unconstitutional, the issue of deportation to
torture and the degree of connection that should be required between
detention and a realistic prospect of deportation.
As will be seen, Parliament took its lead from the Court’s silence on
the larger issues of indeterminate detention, torture and the treatment of
secret information. Parliament’s silence on these critical issues is
consistent with a model of dialogue in which judicial decisions are often
necessary to force legislatures to consider the rights of the unpopular.
The Court’s minimalist decision in Charkaoui did not force Parliament
to deal with these larger issues. In Bill C-3, Parliament was more than
happy to avoid them.118 Parliament also ignored clear recommendations
by both Parliamentary committees that special advocates be used
whenever the government presents secret information on an ex parte
basis. Finally, Parliament did not appear to turn its mind to the long-term
sustainability of security certificates or the related issue of how Canada’s
treatment of secret information can be reformed in order to ensure that
criminal prosecutions are a viable alternative should immigration law
security certificates prove not to be sustainable.
117
For an earlier general discussion see Kent Roach, “Must We Trade Rights for Security?
The Choice Between Smart, Harsh, or Proportionate Security Strategies in Canada and Britain”
(2006) 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2151, at 2188-96.
118
See generally Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or
Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), for an argument that robust judicial review can
force democratic debate about the rights of the unpopular and the treatment of fundamental
principles that legislatures, as majoritarian institutions tied to the electoral cycle, may be inclined to
ignore.
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It could be argued with some justification that it is unrealistic to
expect Parliament to deal with all the difficult issues related to security
certificates and secrecy in one go. Still, there are examples of Parliament
taking a broader response to the task of responding to Charter decisions
about the requirements of adjudicative fairness and section 7 of the
Charter. A good example of Parliament’s unique ability to broaden the
policy debate when crafting a reply to a Charter decision by the courts is
Parliament’s multi-faceted response to the Court’s decision in R. v.
Seaboyer119 that the so-called “rape shield” law restricting the
admissibility of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct was an unjustified
violation of the section 7 rights of the accused. The Court’s decision was
controversial and unpopular. Indeed, there was some initial interest in
using the section 33 override to restore the evidentiary rule that the
Court had struck down with immediate effect. Nevertheless, the
Department of Justice consulted widely on the issue including with
women’s groups and rape crisis centres and was eventually persuaded to
take a broader approach that would define consent for the purposes of
sexual assault law — the widely known “no means no” provisions.
Parliament also changed the fault level for sexual assault, replacing the
controversial defence of honest but unreasonable mistaken belief in
consent with a new requirement that the accused take reasonable steps in
the circumstances known to him to ascertain consent. Only after making
these two fundamental changes to the law of sexual assault, changes that
were not required to respond to the Court’s narrow ruling in Seaboyer,
did Parliament also respond to the narrow ruling in Seaboyer by enacting
new and more flexible restrictions on the admissibility of evidence of the
complainant’s prior sexual conduct. Even then, Parliament broadened
the debate by extending the restrictions to any prior sexual contact that
the complainant may have had with the accused. This episode of
dialogue demonstrates the ability of Parliament to change the rules of the
game when devising responses to the Court’s Charter decisions.
A similarly robust response to Charkaoui might have attempted to
change the rules of the game by providing for special advocates
whenever the government relies upon secret evidence and changing the
rules that are used to define and assert governmental interests in secrecy.
A robust response might also have anticipated further Charter challenges
to the security certificate regime with respect to indeterminate detention
and the deportation to torture issues, even though these issues were not
119
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decided by the Court in Charkaoui. As will be seen, Parliament decided
not to expand the policy debate about secrecy and security certificates in
this manner. It could be argued that the Court’s 12-month suspended
declaration of invalidity did not give the government enough time to
devise such a broad response to Charkaoui. Nevertheless, Parliament’s
broad and seemingly successful response to Seaboyer was crafted in just
over a year. One difference may be that the government’s response to
Seaboyer was only devised after broad consultation that allowed the
people on the ground to inform the government about practical issues
that were arising in sexual assault cases and that needed to be resolved.120
In contrast, Bill C-3 did not seem to have been preceded by widespread
consultation with those who worked on the security certificate cases and
other cases involving governmental claims of secrecy. The Seaboyer
saga suggests that more democracy and consultation in devising replies
to Charter decisions may enrich the nature of the legislative reply.
1. Special Advocates in Other Proceedings
Both parliamentary committees that conducted the three-year review
of anti-terrorism legislation recommended that special advocates should
have a role to play under not only the security certificate provisions of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, but also the national
security confidentiality provisions of the Canada Evidence Act and the
provisions for the listing of terrorist groups and the de-registering of
charities because of alleged involvement in terrorism. The government
decided not to follow this approach and Bill C-3 only provides for
special advocates for security certificate proceedings under the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act. Parliament has the capacity to take a broader
approach to policy issues such as challenges to secret information, but it
can also take a narrower approach if it simply responds to specific Court
decisions.
Parliament’s failure to provide for a broader role for special advocates
does not, however, mean that security cleared lawyers will not be
appointed in other proceedings. Indeed, security cleared lawyers have
already been appointed to assist with section 38 proceedings both in

120
For accounts of this process see Sheila McIntyre, “Redefining Reformism: The
Consultations That Shaped Bill C-49” in Julian Roberts & Renate Mohr, eds., Confronting Sexual
Assault: A Decade of Legal and Social Change (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).
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relation to extradition proceedings121 and a criminal terrorism trial.122
Nevertheless, the availability of special advocates will be litigated on a
case-by-case basis. Indeed, there may be differences within the Federal
Court on these matters: in his decision in Khawaja, Chief Justice Lutfy
indicated that special advocates might have to be available to uphold
section 38 against constitutional challenge,123 whereas the Federal Court
of Appeal did not address this possibility, with one judge hinting that
section 38 would prohibit disclosure of the information to anyone,
possibly including a security cleared lawyer.124 Litigation over such
issues would not be necessary had Parliament clearly indicated in Bill
C-3 that special advocates would be available in all proceedings where
the government was able to make ex parte representations about secret
information.
Another consequence of only including special advocates in
immigration matters under Bill C-3 is that its provisions restricting the
communications of special advocates after they have seen the secret
information will not apply when special advocates are appointed in other
proceedings. Justice Mosley has fashioned conditions on the appointment
of a security cleared lawyer that are similar to Bill C-3 in the Khadr125
case. But this remains a matter of judicial discretion. To the extent that
the restrictions that are placed on special advocates under Bill C-3 are
overbroad or may result in a violation of section 7, however, the fact that
judges are not bound by Bill C-3 when appointing special advocates in
other proceedings may produce some beneficial flexibility, albeit not
flexibility that was intended by Parliament.
2. Deportation to Torture and the Sustainability of Security
Certificates
The Supreme Court asserted at the start of its Charkaoui judgment
that the issue of deportation to torture did not arise on the three cases it
had before it.126 The Court also refused to hold that the long-term
121
122
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detention of the three applicants violated sections 7 and 12 of the
Charter. It distinguished the situation in the House of Lords’ Belmarsh
case on the basis that the Canadian regime did not authorize indeterminate
detention, but only long-term detention pending deportation.127 The issue
of whether detention is pending deportation will inevitably raise the
issue of whether there is a realistic possibility of deportation. In turn,
when deportation would result in suspected terrorists being returned to
countries such as Egypt and Syria, the issue of whether there is a
realistic possibility of deportation will depend on whether the Suresh
exception that contemplates deportation to a substantial risk of torture
will be employed. Although the Suresh exception may not have been
raised squarely on the records of the cases heard in Charkaoui, it hangs
over all the security certificate cases. Nothing would have stopped
Parliament from grappling with the torture issue that was avoided by the
Court. A clear rejection of the Suresh exception would have responded
to international criticisms and have been consistent with the prohibition
in Bill C-3 on the use of secret evidence obtained from torture. It also
would have made clear the need for alternatives to deportation in the
security certificate cases.
Justice Mackay has rejected the government’s attempt to invoke the
Suresh exception to allow the deportation of Mr. Jaballah given the
findings that he faced a “serious risk that he would face torture, death or
inhumane treatment” if he was deported to Egypt.128 Justice Mackay
recognized that the Suresh exception was anomalous and interpreted it
narrowly, ruling:
Suresh, thus far, has led to debate, whether it is within the
discretion of the MCI to deport an inadmissible person to a country
where there is a serious risk of torture. Mr. Justice Dennis O’Connor,
127

Id., at para. 126. See also Chief Justice McLachlin’s conclusion that

In summary, the IRPA, interpreted in conformity with the Charter, permits robust
ongoing judicial review of the continued need for and justice of the detainee’s detention
pending deportation. On this basis, I conclude that extended periods of detention
pending deportation under the certificate provisions of the IRPA do not violate s. 7 or s.
12 of the Charter, provided that reviewing courts adhere to the guidelines set out above.
Thus, the IRPA procedure itself is not unconstitutional on this ground. However, this
does not preclude the possibility of a judge concluding at a certain point that a particular
detention constitutes cruel and unusual treatment or is inconsistent with the principles of
fundamental justice, and therefore infringes the Charter in a manner that is remediable
under s. 24(1) of the Charter.”
Id., at para. 123 (emphasis added).
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as Commissioner, in his Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar,
Analysis and Recommendations, (2006) (Vol. 3) Part II pp. 51-52,
wrote of the right to be free from torture as an absolute right. In his
view, “The infliction of torture, for any purpose, is so fundamental a
violation of human dignity, that it can never be legally justified.” He
makes reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to
several international agreements, including the Convention against
Torture, to which Canada is a party, and to the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms as well as the Criminal Code of Canada, all of
which confirm the absolute rejection of torture. Article 3 of the
Convention Against Torture prohibits a state party from expelling,
returning or extraditing a person to another state where there are
substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of
being subjected to torture.
That prohibition is now widely recognized and accepted in many
countries of the world, including those within the European Union. It is
reflected in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh.
That judgment’s reference to exceptional cases left open for future
consideration cannot have been intended to leave many cases to be
classed as exceptional. Rather, the general principle, as I read Suresh,
is that deportation to a country where there is a substantial risk of
torture would infringe an individual’s rights, in this case Mr. Jaballah’s
rights, under s. 7 of the Charter, and, in my view, infringement
generally would require that the exceptional case would have to be
justified under s. 1.
Here, no case has been argued that Mr. Jaballah’s circumstances
are exceptional, or that they could be so qualified under s.1 of the
Charter. I have found the Ministers’ certified opinion to be reasonable.
By inference that opinion signifies that his continuing presence in
Canada, without restraints, would constitute a danger to the security of
the country. Yet there is no case argued that he has been personally
involved in violence.
I conclude that the facts of this case do not create an exceptional
circumstance that would warrant Mr. Jaballah’s deportation to face
torture abroad.129

If it is accepted that this decision is good law, and in my view it should
be,130 then it is unlikely that the Suresh exception will be used in any of
129

Id., at paras. 80-83.
For my criticisms of the Suresh exceptions see Kent Roach, “Constitutional, Remedial
and International Dialogues About Rights: The Canadian Experience” (2005) 40 Tex. Int’l L.J. 537.
130

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CHARKAOUI AND BILL C-3

335

the remaining security certificate cases. It would be especially odd to do
so when Bill C-3 itself repudiates evidence obtained as a result of
torture, as well as degrading, cruel and unusual treatment. If Canada
rightly does not want to have blood on its hands with evidence obtained
as a result of torture, it surely would not want to deport a person to a
substantial risk of torture.
Parliament had available to it some sound advice on how the issue of
deportation to torture lies at the heart of our present security certificate
cases. The Senate Committee that conducted the three-year review of our
anti-terrorism legislation noted a few days before the Supreme Court
delivered its judgment in Charkaoui that both the United Nations
Committee Against Torture and the Human Rights Committee had called
on Canada to reaffirm its commitment to the absolute right against
torture despite the controversial statement in Suresh v. Canada that in
some “exceptional circumstances” deportation to torture might be
consistent with the Canadian Charter (though not with international law).
The Senate Committee recommended that the immigration law be
amended to repeal the Suresh exception that would allow deportation to
the substantial risk of torture.131 At the same time, the Senate Committee
was not naïve about the dilemmas posed by suspected terrorists who
cannot be deported to home countries with poor human rights records. It
recommended work on ensuring the effectiveness of assurances that a
person would not be tortured. It also recommended that Canada show
leadership at the United Nations in resolving the dilemmas created by
suspected terrorists who may be subject to indeterminate detention and
control in circumstances where they cannot be deported to their country
of citizenship because they will be tortured. Canada is not alone in
grappling with the difficulties of how to treat terrorist suspects who
cannot be deported because of concerns that they will face torture if
returned to their country of citizenship.
Parliament in Bill C-3 ignored the conundrum of deporting noncitizens suspected of terrorism to torture or subjecting them to indeterminate
detention in Canada. On the one hand, Canada should honour its
international commitments against being involved with torture. On the
other hand, refusal to deport such persons could result in indeterminate
detention that may eventually be held to violate sections 7 and 12 of the
Charter. It is perhaps understandable that Parliament did not rush in to
131
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solve this thorny dilemma. The release of most of the security certificate
detainees under very restrictive house arrest conditions is the present
solution, but it is unlikely to be a satisfactory or permanent one. The
detainees will continue to exercise their Charter rights to challenge the
very tight restrictions placed on them. The Supreme Court in Charkaoui
has made clear that the detainees have Charter rights to such regular
reviews and it has not precluded the possibility that a court might in the
future hold that continued restrictions on liberty will violate the Charter.
Bill C-3 only postpones the day of reckoning when courts will have to
decide whether to deport these detainees despite the risk of torture or
release them because their indeterminate detention under immigration
law without realistic prospect of deportation violates their rights under
the Charter.
If one accepts the government’s position that the detainees are a
danger to national security with connections to international terrorist
groups, then the ultimate response to the security certificate cases may
be to attempt to bring criminal prosecutions against the detainees. These
prosecutions could possibly relate to actions before their detention,
though in most cases charges under the Anti-terrorism Act would not be
possible because those offences could not be charged in relation to
events that occurred before December of 2001. Conversely, if the
detainees are really terrorists, it could be expected that after release they
might engage in activities that could lead to charges under the Antiterrorism Act or other criminal charges. One of the obstacles to using the
criminal law as a means to incapacitate and punish terrorists, however, is
the recently documented tendency of the Government of Canada to make
overbroad claims of secrecy. Such claims not only limit the type of
evidence that can be used in criminal prosecutions where secret evidence
is not accepted, but they also cause extensive litigation under section 38
of the Canada Evidence Act in order to obtain non-disclosure orders.
Such orders are not costless because the trial judge retains the ultimate
ability to decide whether a fair trial is possible in light of the nondisclosure orders.132

132
Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 38.14. The use of s. 38 in criminal trials
also prolongs criminal trials by requiring litigation of issues concerning national security
confidentiality in the Federal Court. See, generally, Kent Roach, The Unique Challenges of
Terrorism Prosecutions: Towards a Workable Relation Between Intelligence and Evidence, Vol. 4
of the Research Studies of the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air
India Flight 182 (forthcoming).
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3. The Problems Presented by Overclaiming of Secrecy
The use of security certificates against suspected terrorists in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11 allowed Canadian officials to use secret
evidence, including intelligence provided by our allies, without risking
disclosure. As a result of the Court’s decision in Charkaoui, it will
become more difficult to rely on such secret evidence. Special advocates
under Bill C-3 will be able to see the secret information. They will be
able to argue that the secret evidence presented by the government
should be ignored by the reviewing judge because it is irrelevant or
obtained as a result of torture or degrading or inhumane treatment.
Special advocates will also be able to challenge the government’s claims
that the information must be kept secret to prevent harms to national
security or other persons. Given the experience with overclaiming to be
examined below, there is reason to believe that special advocates will
enjoy some success in resisting governmental claims of secrecy. Indeed,
the government may have recognized that it had engaged in overclaiming
in the security certificate cases: it declassified a good deal of material
when it recommenced security certificate proceedings after Bill C-3 had
been proclaimed in force.133 This may have been a pre-emptive move to
minimize the chances that special advocates could succeed in arguing
that the release of some of the previously secret material would not harm
national security or any person. The new special advocate regime may
have scored a significant victory for more disclosure even before it
became operational.
4. The Arar Commission and the Problems of Overclaiming
Secrecy
The Arar Commission experience provides a number of lessons
about the dangers of excessive claims of secrecy by the government. The
Arar Commission recognized from the outset its duty to protect secrets.
Its terms of reference instructed it not to release information “if in the
opinion of the Commissioner, the disclosure of that information would
be injurious to international relations, national defence or national security”.
The Commission repeatedly stressed the importance of respecting
caveats or restrictions on the use of information according to the third
133
Stewart Bell et al., “Ottawa Reveals Classified Files on Five Terror Suspects” National
Post, February 22, 2008. The newly revealed material included the existence of CSIS wiretaps and
surveillance as well as allegations against the detainees that were made public for the first time.
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party rule. It also recognized that there were many types of injurious
information including “confidential sources of information (informers)
and details of ongoing national security investigations”.134 In recognition
of its national security confidentiality (“NSC”) obligations, the Commission
also agreed to conduct much of its hearings in camera, but with the
expectation that periodic summaries of the information would be
prepared to inform the public and the excluded parties as much as
possible about what was happening behind closed doors.
Despite its awareness of NSC concerns, the Arar Commission and
the government came into conflict over the release of a summary of
evidence concerning the involvement of CSIS. Justice O’Connor
proposed a summary of about seven pages that he concluded could be
released without causing injury, whereas the government proposed a
summary of about three pages that it believed could be disclosed.
Moreover, the government indicated that it would initiate proceedings
under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act if the Commission released
its more extensive summary.135 In order to avoid what it concluded
would be protracted and repeated litigation under section 38 that would
delay the inquiry, the Commission abandoned its attempts to produce
summaries. Instead, the commission continued its in camera hearings
until April 2005. In the end, the Commission had 75 days of in camera
hearings and 45 days of public hearings.
In his report, O’Connor J. noted that the government had abandoned
some of its previous NSC claims, particularly in relation to the
inflammatory and inaccurate request by the RCMP for border lookouts
that described Maher Arar and Monia Mazigh as Islamic extremists with
connections to Al Qaeda and in relation to the RCMP sending questions
for Syrian Military intelligence to ask Mr. Almalki. Although he noted
that it may have been understandable for the government to err on the
side of caution, O’Connor J. was critical of the government’s approach
to NSC claims. He commented that:
… overclaiming exacerbates the transparency and procedural fairness
that inevitably accompany any proceeding that cannot be fully open
because of NSC concerns. It also promotes public suspicion and
134
Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar,
Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (Ottawa: Public
Works and Government Services, 2006), at 283.
135
Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar,
Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Factual Background, vol. 2 (Ottawa: Public Works
and Government Services, 2006), at 738.
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cynicism about legitimate claims by the Government of national
security confidentiality. … I am raising the issue of the Government’s
overly broad NSC claims in the hope that the experience in this inquiry
may provide some guidance for other proceedings. In legal and
administrative proceedings where the Government makes NSC claims
over some information, the single most important factor in trying to
ensure public accountability and fairness is for the Government to limit
from the outset, the breadth of those claims to what is truly necessary.
Litigating questionable NSC claims is in nobody’s interest. Although
government agencies may be tempted to make NSC claims to shield
certain information from public scrutiny and avoid potential
embarrassment, that temptation should always be resisted. 136

These comments reflected the particular experience of the Arar inquiry,
but they also produce questions about whether the government has
engaged in similar overclaiming in security certificate proceedings. They
also foreshadowed some of the Supreme Court’s concerns about security
certificates in Charkaoui by indicating the inverse relation between the
breadth of secrecy claims and the fairness of proceedings. As the
Supreme Court would subsequently note, secrecy in security certificate
hearings prevents the detainee from fully defending himself. They even
preclude the judge from asking critical questions of the detainee for fear
of revealing secrets.137
Despite the reduction of the government’s NSC claims during the
course of the Arar inquiry, the commission and the government could
not agree on the release of certain portions of the report. Although there
was agreement between the government and the commission about the
release of 99.5 per cent of the report, a quantitative approach would be
misleading. The Commission’s report was long, comprising three volumes,
in large part because so much of the hearings were heard in camera. The
release of the majority of the disputed 1,500 words as authorized by the
Federal Court under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act revealed
136
Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar,
Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations, supra, note 134, at
302, 304.
137
Charkaoui, supra, note 105, at para. 64:

… the judge’s activity on behalf of the named person is confined to what is presented by
the ministers. The judge is therefore not in a position to compensate for the lack of
informed scrutiny, challenge and counter-evidence that a person familiar with the case
could bring. Such scrutiny is the whole point of the principle that a person whose liberty
is in jeopardy must know the case to meet. Here that principle has not merely been
limited; it has been effectively gutted. How can one meet a case one does not know?
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some matters that certainly caught public attention, even if the initial
non-disclosure of these matters did not prevent the commission from
discharging its mandate of investigating the actions of Canadian officials
in relation to Mr. Arar.
In reaching a conclusion that parts of the disputed passages could be
released, Noël J. indicated that some of the information redacted from
the Arar Commission report if released would not injure national security,
national defence or international relations.138 This is an extraordinary
finding given the deference that is generally paid to the government on
the existence of injury139 and the breadth of state interests protected
under the rubric of national security, national defence and international
relations. Such a finding of no harm to national security would have led
to the release of secret information in security certificate proceedings
even though in such proceedings, unlike under section 38 of the Canada
Evidence Act, the judge has no discretion to balance the competing
public interests in disclosure and non-disclosure.
The release of the majority of the information from the public Arar
Commission report that the government had challenged under section 38
of the CEA has added more fuel to concerns about government
overclaiming of NSC. Some of the new information that was ordered
released by the Federal Court simply related to the fact that the RCMP
had contacts with the FBI and the CIA. In one case, the government’s
redactions were lifted on references to the RCMP and CSIS. 140 In other
cases, the redactions applied to a suspicion held by a senior CSIS official
that the Americans wanted to have Arar removed to Jordan where “they
can have their way with him”.141 The precise nature of the government’s
NSC claim in relation to this statement is not outlined in the public
judgment in the matter, but likely relates to claims that such observations
138
Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of
Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar — O’Connor Commission), [2007] F.C.J. No. 1081,
2007 FC 766, at para. 91 (F.C.) [hereinafter “Canada v. Commission of Inquiry”].
139
Justice Noël for example commented: “It is trite law in Canada, as well as in numerous
other common law jurisdictions, that courts should accord deference to decisions of the executive in
what concerns matters of national security, national defence and international relations, as the
executive is considered to have greater knowledge and expertise in such matters than the courts.”
Id., at para. 46.
140
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might damage our relations with the CIA. Although such claims could
perhaps be squeezed into the broad confines of Canada’s national
security or international relations interests, they also suggest concerns
about a disclosure that might be embarrassing to Canadian and American
agencies.
Another portion of the Arar report that was authorized for release
related to findings that the RCMP used information obtained from Mr.
El Maati in Syria without mention of the possibility of torture or that the
DFAIT’s observations about him being observed in good condition were
made nine months after his alleged confession.142 Although the exact
nature of the government’s NSC argument is not disclosed in the public
judgment, the relation to national security or international relation
interests seem tenuous, especially compared to the public interest in
disclosure of such practices. Finally, it should be emphasized that the
government’s decision to oppose the release of the above information
was not lightly made. Justice Noël has stated that it was made in a
process that involved several deputy ministers and the briefing of the
responsible Ministers.143
5. Other Cases of Overclaiming Secrecy
Justice Noël’s conclusions in the Arar Commission case should also
be combined with Mosley J.’s statement in his first section 38 decision
in Khawaja144 that “those holding the black pens seem to have assumed
that each reference to CSIS must be redacted from the documents even
when there is no apparent risk of disclosure of sensitive information such
as operational methods or investigative techniques or the identity of their
employees” and his statement in his second section 38 decision in the
same case that he would have been inclined to find no injury to national
security with respect to the information that the government had claimed
secrecy. In that case, Mosley J. remarked that “there tends to be an
excessive redaction of innocuous information in these cases”.145
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These three decisions by specially designated judges of the Federal
Court with extensive experience with national security matters provide
independent confirmation of O’Connor J.’s observations that not all is
right with respect to the government’s secrecy claims. It is troubling that
the government has continued to overclaim national security
confidentiality after O’Connor J.’s criticisms of their position at the Arar
Commission. In both the Khawaja and the Arar Commission cases, the
government has claimed NSC over some material that judges of the
Federal Court have determined would not cause injury to national
security, national defence or international relations. These findings raise
serious questions about whether there has been similar overclaiming in
the security certificate cases.
The reasons why the government might overclaim NSC are
speculative and will probably never be known, given that the process
itself is protected by both NSC and attorney-client privilege. It is likely
affected by a number of factors including the fact that the Attorney
General of Canada represents all the various agencies that may want to
assert NSC claims, limits on resources and capacity in the redaction
process, and concerns that Canada’s oft-noted position as a net importer
of intelligence makes it particularly vulnerable to concerns, legitimate or
not, that allies might have about disclosure of information that they have
shared with Canada. Indeed, the government argued in the section 38
proceedings in relation to the Arar Commission that the mere fact of
asking other countries to consider amending caveats or restrictions on
the use of information could cause damage to information sharing with
allies.146 This position is contrary to that taken by the Arar Commission
which stressed the importance of caveats, but also made clear that it was
perfectly acceptable to request an originating agency to make changes to
caveats. Indeed, the passage of time may make it possible for caveats to
be amended to allow the disclosure of material that would no longer
reveal ongoing investigations or vulnerable sources.
There are aspects of Bill C-3 that speak to a culture in Ottawa that
places a premium on secrecy and is very anxious about the risk of
inadvertent disclosure of secret information. As discussed above, section
85.4(2) contains a stunningly broad provision that essentially prohibits a
special advocate from communicating “with another person about the
proceeding” without judicial authorization after the special advocate has
seen the secret information. This provision exists despite the fact that the
146
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special advocate has received a security clearance and is a person
permanently bound to secrecy under the Security of Information Act.147
Likewise, section 83(1.2)(c) requires a judge to deny the detainee’s
request for a specific special advocate in cases where the special
advocate already has had access to secret information the disclosure of
which would be injurious to national security or endanger the safety of a
person if “there is a risk of inadvertent disclosure of that information or
other evidence”. This provision seems to require a zero risk of
inadvertent disclosure of information. It discounts the records of SIRC
and Commission counsel in handling secret information in a careful
manner.148
6. Has There Been Overclaiming in Security Certificate Cases?
The above cases raise concerns that there has been overclaiming of
secrecy in security certificate cases. Concerns about overclaiming are in
some respects even more pressing in the security certificate context.
Under section 78 of the IRPA, the specially designated judge is not
allowed to disclose any evidence that he or she concludes would be
injurious to national security or the safety of any person. Unlike under
section 38.06 of the Canada Evidence Act, the judge is not given the
power to balance and weigh the degree of injury against the public
interest in disclosure. At the same time, section 78 of the IRPA does not
include the broad concepts of injury to national defence and international
relations found in section 38 of the CEA. This is probably a neglected
advantage of the IRPA over the CEA.
The government’s decision to make public much more information
when it refiled the security certificates after the proclamation of Bill C-3
is consistent with the idea that the government had overclaimed NSC in
past security certificate cases. Some of the new allegations included in
the public documents include allegations that Adil Charkaoui was
overheard discussing a 1998 stay in a terrorist training camp in
Afghanistan; that Mahmoud Jaballah was in regular contact with alQaeda’s second in command, Ayman al Zawahiri after Jaballah came to
147

R.S.C. 1985, c. O-5.
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Canada; that Hassan Almrei gained access to a restricted area of
Toronto’s Pearson airport shortly after his arrival in Canada and that
Mohamed Harkat was heard saying in 1998 that he would soon be
“ready” to take part in jihad.149 The accuracy of these new allegations are
not known, but the fact that they were revealed in public for the first time
when new security certificates were filed suggests that the government
had reconsidered its initial decision that the release of such information
would harm national security.
7. Rehabilitating and Disciplining Secrecy Claims
Given the problems documented above in overclaiming national
security confidentiality under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act, it
might be a mistake to amend the reference to harm to national security or
persons in section 78 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to
track the broader formulation of harm to international relations, national
security or national defence found in the CEA. One problem with the
broad terms used in the CEA is that they can support arguments that
even asking for amendments of caveats could harm Canada’s relations
with its allies including perhaps damage caused by embarrassment. The
Special Senate Committee that conducted a three-year review of the
Anti-terrorism Act was concerned that the vague reference to
international relations could be used to shield information that may
cause some embarrassment to the government.150
In his section 38 decision with respect to the Arar Commission, Noël
J. attempted the difficult task of defining the operative terms of section
38. He suggested that national security “means at minimum the
preservation of the Canadian way of life, including the safeguarding of
the security of persons, institutions and freedoms in Canada”.151
149
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International relations “refers to information that if disclosed would be
injurious to Canada’s relations with foreign nations”.152 National defence
includes “[a]ll measures taken by a nation to protect itself against its
enemies” and “a nation’s military establishment”.153 Although the
attempt at definition is admirable, the result is not satisfactory. It is
difficult to imagine broader and vaguer statutory terms, and these terms
seem to have become even broader in the process of definition. The
problem may be the vagueness of the statutory terms. I am reminded of
my colleague Marty Friedland’s introduction to his study for the
McDonald Commission: “I start this study on the legal dimensions of
national security with a confession: I do not know what national security
means. But then, neither does the government.”154 In the investigative
hearing cases, the Supreme Court pointedly refused to accept the
government’s argument that the purpose of the Anti-terrorism Act was to
protect “national security” in part because of a concern about the
“rhetorical urgency”155 of the broad term. Although Parliament has made
a specific choice to use the term “national security” in both section 38 of
the CEA and section 78 of the IRPA, there is a need to discipline and
rehabilitate the abused concept. There are some good reasons to protect
secrets, including threats to the safety of informers, threats to ongoing
investigations and promises made to our allies. These reasons, however,
may be lost in references to the vague generalities of national security
and threats to international relations.
The breadth of the definitions of national security, national defence
and international relations may play a role in encouraging the government
to overclaim NSC. In some respects, references to the vague and
intangible notions of national security, national defence and international
relations have taken on a rhetorical life of their own. In my view,
thought should be given to rebuilding the NSC process from the ground
up. One possibility would be to list the specific and serious harms that
the disclosure of secret information can cause in some cases. Section 78
of the IRPA already starts this process by referring to injury to the safety
of any person. Greater specificity about the danger to informers or
undercover agents could perhaps provide even greater discipline to this
152
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concept. A disciplined harm-based approach might help the government
think through their NSC claims and avoid overclaiming in the future. It
could also address the public suspicion and cynicism that O’Connor J.
accurately noted would follow patently overbroad NSC claims made by
the government.
There are reasons to believe that this may be a particularly opportune
time to rethink NSC concepts. Several recent decisions have begun to
question some of the main pillars of our traditional approach to NSC.
The courts have begun to re-examine one old chestnut, namely, the
government’s penchant for invoking the mosaic effect as justification for
withholding information that might on its face appear innocuous. The
informed reader that the mosaic effect has traditionally been concerned
with is a member of a well-resourced foreign intelligence agency such as
the former KGB. Although some terrorist groups may try to develop a
web-based counter-intelligence capacity, they do not have the resources
of the KGB. Both Mosley J. and Noël J. have recently warned that
mechanical invocation of the mosaic effect will not be sufficient to
justify a non-disclosure claim.156 In my view, the mosaic effect has its
roots in concerns about counter-intelligence and the Cold War when the
usual remedy was continued surveillance or expulsion of suspected
spies. Its use should be rethought in a context in which secrecy claims
are made to withhold information from suspected terrorists who face
prolonged deprivations of liberty under immigration or criminal law. In
the contemporary context, there may be both less harm from disclosure
of “apparently innocuous information” and more harm from its nondisclosure.
Even the most basic rule of the NSC regime, the third party rule that
prohibits the disclosure of caveated information without the permission
of the originating agency, is being rethought in light of new realities and
new developments such as changes in information technology and the
156
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growth of information that is in the public domain. Justice O’Connor in
the Arar Commission report stressed that caveats are not absolute
barriers to the further disclosure of information. They simply establish
proper channels for the authorization of further disclosure.157 The Arar
Commission also raised concerns about applying the third party rule to
information that is already in the public domain.158
The Arar Commission is not alone in questioning a mechanical
application of the third party rule. Justice Mosley in Khawaja has
observed that although it is important, the third party rule “is not all
encompassing”. He expressed agreement with the proposition that “it is
not open to the Attorney General to merely claim that information
cannot be disclosed pursuant to the third party rule, if a request for
disclosure in some form has not in fact been made to the original foreign
source”.159 He also indicated that the third party rule does not protect the
existence of relationships where no information is exchanged or apply to
information that the Canadian agency was aware of before receiving the
information from the foreign source.160 These are significant and
emerging limitations on the scope of the third party rule that take into
account changing circumstances. There may be a case for including them
in a new and more specific harm based approach that moves beyond the
discredited generalities of references to national security or international
relations.
The above discussion of the dangers of overclaiming could have
been relevant to Parliament’s response to Charkaoui in a number of
ways. Parliament could have taken the opportunity to provide a role for
special advocates in all proceedings in which the government claims
national security confidentiality without the other side being present. By
providing adversarial challenge to all claims of secrecy, an expanded
157
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special advocate system would have placed government claims of
secrecy under more critical scrutiny.
Another pre-emptive response to past experiences with overclaiming
would have been for Parliament to have attempted to categorize with
more precision the range of legitimate secrets and harms to national
security both as they are defined under IRPA and section 38 of the
Canada Evidence Act. Indeed, reform of the section 38 process might
become an even more urgent priority had policy-makers reached the
conclusion that deportation or indeterminate detention of the five men
presently held under security certificates was not sustainable. When such
conclusions are reached, then it becomes even more important that the
criminal process be able to respond to the challenges of terrorism
prosecutions. In such a scenario, Canada must be prepared to seek nondisclosure orders under section 38 in a disciplined and timely fashion in
order to protect promises made to allies, confidential sources of
information and ongoing investigations.
The end game and the exit strategy with respect to security
certificates may be the use of the criminal process, including the use of a
reformed section 38 process. In Bill C-3, however, Parliament did not
address either the sustainability of security certificates or the need to
discipline secrecy claims.
8. Summary
Parliament’s response to Charkaoui was an example of dialogue, but
a truncated dialogue that did not capitalize on the ability of the legislature
to place the particular issues examined by the courts into a larger policy
context. Bill C-3 is partial dialogue because it ignores larger questions
about how secret information is treated in other legal proceedings. It
only makes special advocates available in immigration proceedings and
it fails to address any of the causes of overclaiming of secrecy including
the breadth and vagueness of the concept of causing harm to national
security.
Although Bill C-3 addressed the issue of intelligence produced by
torture, the legislation, as well as the Court in Charkaoui, ducked the
question of whether the government should be allowed to continue to
rely on the infamous Suresh161 exception that contemplates deportation to
161
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torture. Although it appears increasingly unlikely that courts will approve
the use of such an exception, its potential availability can play a role in
sustaining the illusion that indeterminate detention is still related to
deportation. It would have been best for the government to face up to the
fact that it will not be able to deport the detainees to Egypt and Syria and
likely not to Morocco or Algeria. Such a realization would have forced
the government to recognize that the security certificate regime is not
sustainable. Instead, the government interpreted the refusal of the Court
to strike down prolonged detention under security certificates as an
indication that the security certificate regime is, except for the absence of
adversarial challenge, fundamentally sound. Although the Supreme
Court in Charkaoui sent some hints that indeterminate detention, even
under strict conditions of house arrest, will eventually become
unconstitutional and may well become unconstitutional if there is no
reasonable prospect of deportation, Parliament ignored these warnings
and decided to wait until the courts finally say enough is enough.

V. CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision in Charkaoui does not resolve most of the
outstanding issues with respect to security certificates. One limit of
judicial policy-making is that courts are to some extent captives of the
case before them. Courts can push against the episodic nature of judicial
policymaking by deciding issues that may not be strictly necessary to
resolve the dispute or they can embrace it by adopting a form of judicial
minimalism that focuses on the case before them. The Court’s approach
in Charkaoui tended towards minimalism. Constitutional minimalism
has been defended as a form of judicial review that maximizes space for
legislative policy-making and recognizes the limits of the judiciary’s
ability to make policy.162 Contrary to this theory, however, the Court’s
minimalism in Charkaoui appears to maximize the ability of courts, not
legislatures, to make important decisions in future cases. Thus the
Court’s decision in Charkaoui leaves it to other courts to decide whether
the Suresh exception for deportation to torture will be utilized. In turn,
other courts will have to decide whether the possible application of the
Suresh exception will justify long-term detention as necessarily tied to
deportation or whether rejection of the exception will lead to a conclusion
that continued detention violates the Charter. The day of reckoning both
162
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with respect to deportation to torture and the limits of indeterminate
detention under security certificates was only postponed by Charkaoui
and Bill C-3. Such a postponement has huge costs for the detainees who,
even when released from actual imprisonment, are detained under strict
conditions. The dialogue produced by Charkaoui failed to deal with the
issues of continued detention and the possibility of deportation to torture
that are likely the main concerns of the detainees.
The Court only addressed the need for adversarial challenge with
respect to secret evidence used in security certificate cases. The Court’s
focus in this respect is easier to defend than its avoidance of deportation
of torture and indeterminate detention because Charkaoui only raised
immigration law issues. Parliament, however, was not the captive of the
Charkaoui case. It could have followed the advice it received from its
Parliamentary committees and made special advocates available in other
proceedings where secret evidence is used. Parliament’s failure to do so,
however, will leave these questions to be determined by the judiciary on
a case by case basis.
Parliament also deferred to the judiciary the critical questions of
whether special advocates will be able to consult with detainees and
others after they have seen the secret information and whether special
advocates will be able to demand further disclosure and call witnesses.
All of these activities may in some cases be critical to the ability of
special advocates effectively to challenge the government’s case against
the detainees. If the presiding Federal Court judges are cautious about
allowing special advocates to play this more robust role because of
concerns about the inadvertent leakage of secrets, then special advocates
will not likely be successful in providing adversarial challenge to the
secret evidence. This is unfortunate because both counsel representing
SIRC and commission counsel in the Arar Commission had more
flexibility with respect to their ability to question affected persons and
their lawyers after having seen the secret information or to demand
further disclosure from the government.
The fact that Parliament has selected the regime of adversarial
challenge that is most sensitive to the state’s interest in preserving
secrets should not be surprising, especially given Canada’s notorious
anxiety about being a net importer of intelligence. Nevertheless,
Parliament’s decision will adversely affect the detainee’s interests in
having the most effective challenge to the government’s secret evidence.
It is possible that special advocates may be reluctant to request the
presiding judge for further powers because of a fear of signalling their
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case to the government. Under either of the above scenarios, the main
flaws identified by the Supreme Court in Charkaoui — the lack of
effective challenge to the government’s secret case against the detainee
— would remain largely unaddressed. That said, special advocates could
still play a valuable role in providing adversarial challenges to
governmental claims about the need for secrecy. In fulfilling this role,
special advocates may very well be able to push more of the
government’s case into the open where the detainee and his lawyers can
mount their own effective challenge. If past experiences with overclaiming
of secrecy by the government are any indication, special advocates may
enjoy considerable success when they engage in adversarial challenge to
governmental claims of secrecy even though the judges presiding in
security certificate cases continue to be required to prohibit disclosure
once they conclude that the release of information will harm national
security or other persons. Indeed, the government’s decision to make
public much more of the secret intelligence that it had previously used to
justify the security certificates suggests that the special advocate regime
has already won a significant victory for more generous disclosure to the
detainees.
Although the independent security-cleared counsel contemplated by
the Court in Charkaoui and created in Bill C-3 could help combat
overclaiming of secrecy, its role in ensuring the fair treatment of the
accused is more problematic. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in
Charkaoui focused on the role that security-cleared amicus curiae
played in the Arar Commission in challenging and evaluating the
government’s claims to secrecy. The Supreme Court did not discuss the
more important role played by security-cleared Commission counsel in
ensuring that the government disclosed all relevant information; in
calling and cross-examining relevant witnesses; and in consulting with
Mr. Arar and his counsel after Commission counsel had examined the
secret information. Any new security-cleared counsel that is injected into
the security certificate process that cannot play such a role will be, at
best, a half measure.
An Arar-style amicus curiae or one based on British special
advocates may respond to the manifest danger of overclaiming of NSC,
but it will be at a disadvantage in responding to the dangers of unfair and
inaccurate decisions based on secret material. The special advocate may
have to be allowed to demand further disclosure, call witnesses and
interview the detainees and others about the secret material in order to be
able effectively to challenge that material. Effective challenge will also
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require the special advocate to be able to make informed arguments that
the secret evidence has been obtained as a result of torture or cruel,
inhumane and degrading treatment or that it is irrelevant when it is
assessed in its proper context. Under Bill C-3, judges will make
decisions about whether it is necessary for special advocates to consult
the detainee or others after having seen the secret information or demand
further disclosure on a case-by-case basis.
There is a danger that attempting to “Charter proof” security
certificates by adding security-cleared special advocates to the process
will gloss over more fundamental questions about the fairness of relying
on secret intelligence as opposed to evidence to justify indeterminate
detention or deportation of suspected terrorists. Moreover, Bill C-3 does
not address the critical question of the ultimate disposition of the
security certificate detainees given concerns that they will be tortured if
deported and that the tight conditions of qualified release that have been
placed on them will eventually become intolerable and unconstitutional.
Bill C-3 does not even address some of the most important questions
about the role of special advocates including whether they will be able to
consult with detainees after having seen the secret information and whether
they will be able to demand further disclosure from the government or
call their own witnesses. Bill C-3 leaves those questions to the decision
of the judges presiding at security certificate proceedings.
The extent of the dialogue between Parliament and the courts will
depend on the willingness of both institutions to play their respective roles.
In Charkaoui, the Court took a relatively minimalist approach to the
exercise of its role in determining whether the security certificate regime
was consistent with the Charter. In Bill C-3, Parliament similarly
pursued a minimalist agenda with respect to reform of security
certificates and delegated some of the most important and difficult issues
to the courts.
The dialogue model which facilitates legislative responses to Charter
decisions provides an opportunity for the legislature to place the
injustices revealed by successful Charter litigation into a larger context.
But dialogic constitutionalism only provides such an opportunity, it does
not guarantee it. It could not be otherwise in a model that claims to be
democratic and to preserve the prerogatives of the elected legislatures to
make good or bad policy or to decline to make policy at all. Bill C-3
largely failed to take the opportunity of expanding the policy debate in
responding to Charkaoui to deal with other issues concerning the
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sustainability of security certificates or the treatment of information that
the government claims should be secret.
Even if Bill C-3 is found to be a perfectly acceptable response to
Charkaoui that allows adversarial challenge to secret evidence and
ensures fair treatment of detainees in that particular respect, it is only a
matter of time before detainees bring Charter challenges to the long-term
restrictions on their liberty that have been imposed under security
certificates and before it is recognized that the detainees face a
substantial risk of torture if they are returned to their home countries.
The day of reckoning on torture and indeterminate detention with respect
to security certificates awaits. Meanwhile the detainees must wait and
live under very tight controls. The detainees eventually will be released
because the status quo even after Bill C-3 is not and should not be
sustainable. At that point in time, there may be another day of reckoning
with respect to the viability of criminal prosecutions as an alternative to
the extraordinary procedures of security certificates. As suggested above,
such prosecutions will implicate the way that the government treats
secret information and the need for a fair and efficient process to
determine what material can be subject to non-disclosure under section
38 of the Canada Evidence Act. Although cases such as Charkaoui and
Khadr focus on extraordinary procedures, there is a need to ensure that
the criminal process remains a viable response to the threat of terrorism
and a fairer alternative to reliance on extraordinary procedures.
Charkaoui and Bill C-3 are only partial responses to the many
dilemmas raised by security certificates and secrecy. They provide some
improvements on the margin, but much work remains to be done. The
detainees will have no choice but to continue to challenge in court their
indeterminate detention and their possible deportation to torture. They
may also challenge the adequacy of the new special advocate regime.
Charkaoui and Bill C-3 only represent a minimalist episode in a
continued dialogue between courts and legislatures that must occur about
the justice and necessity of the security certificate regime.

